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Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum

of Nice
PatrickR. Hugg
ABSTRACT

In December 2000 the European Council Summit in Nice

fulfilled the promise for European Union enlargement made at the
Helsinki Summit the year before. The leaders of the EU Member
States reaffirmed their commitment to the accession of the
applicantcountries, makingpossible the broadre-unificationof the
continent under democraticrule of law andfree market economies.
This Article focuses specifically on the accession of the island of
Cyprus, Europe's remaining divided state, poised strategically
between East and West. The island'sarmed stand-of/presentsthe
clearest example of legal conflict between two ethnic communities
in a discrete geographicalterritory, magnifying the multilayered
cultural and religious divisions of the region. The Article traces
the centuries of conflict on the island, then explores the dramatic
breakthroughs of the 1999 Helsinki Summit and the recent
rapprochement of Cyprus' patron states of Greece and Turkey,
culminating with the advance of the 2000 Nice Summit. The
Article arguesthat EU leaders shouldseize this opportunityto use
EU enlargement to lead the two communities into a functional
plan for a bicommunal structure and process of cooperationthat
can build toward an evolving, long-term resolutionof this ancient
conflict.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union's principal task in the first decades of the
21st century is to spread peace, stability, security, and
prosperity to the entire European continent. The chief
mechanism for achieving this end is the enlargement of the
1
Union.

The recently concluded European Council Summit at Nice
foreshadows "an imposing new shape rising on the global stage,"2 as
European leaders fulfilled their promise to advance the Union's
eastward enlargement. 3 The European Council officially "reaffirm[ed]
the historic significance of the European Union enlargement and the
political priority which it attaches to the success of that process. '4 More
than four days of marathon talks produced a pre-dawn deal on
institutional reforms "paving the way for the European Union to almost
double in size in the next decade."5 Thus, the legal and logistical path
was cleared for the Central and Eastern European countries, and other
applicants such as Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey, to join in the broad
European Union of a single economic market and democratic standards
of government.6 '"This surely is cause for celebration. Whatever its

1.

CHARLES GRANT, EU 2010, AN OPTIMISTIC VISION OFTHE FUTURE 7 (2000). In

his newest work, this British author sets forth a sanguine perspective for the first ten
years of the new millennium in Europe. Id. See also Horst Gunter Krenzler, The
Geostrategicand InternationalPoliticalImplicationsof EUEnlargement,2 EUR. U. INST.,
RSC 1 (1998) available at http://www.ieu.it/ERPA/mainfiles/..RSC/WP-Texts/
krenzler2.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2001) (stating that "the historic mission of the
European Union is to contribute to stability and peace through integration ...").
2.
"Peer past the verbal sludge and fudge, bad blood and bruised egos, and you
can now see-thanks to four days of argument among the European Union's 15 leadersan imposing new shape rising on the global stage." A Treat From Nice, ECONOMIST, Dec.
16, 2000, at 18.
3.
Presidency Conclusions at the Nice European Council Meeting, Dec. 7-9, 2000,
at 1-2 [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions]. The European Council endorsed the principle
of differentiation based on each country's own progress toward accession, as placing the
EU, "in accordance with the objective set by the European Council in Helsinki, in a
position to welcome those new Member States which are ready as from the end of
2002...." See also Barry James, EULeaders Eke Out a Face-SavingTreaty, INTL HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 12, 2000, at 1 (quoting Jacques Chirac as saying "we will keep our word.").
4.
Presidency Conclusions, supra note 3, at 1.
5.
Agreement Reached at Crucial EU Enlargement Summit, AGENcE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2000. ("News of the accord [at the milestone summit] came at 4:30 a.m.
as the talks went into a fifth tough day ....).
6.
A Treat From Nice, supra note 2, at 18. The European Council "welcom[ed]
the stepping up of accession negotiations.... [and] believes that the time has now come to
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'7
imperfections, the Nice summit was a success.
The Summit at Nice may, as French President Jacques Chirac
expressed it, "go down as a great summit," though more for what it
allowed to proceed forward than for its specific reforms or new
initiatives.8 Chirac acknowledged that the advance of qualified majority
voting into only twenty-nine more treaty articles was disappointing, but
insisted that the Treaty will "remain in the history books as a great
summit because of the extent and complexity of issues settled."9 French
Foreign Minister, Hubert Wdrine, lauded the treaty for its pragmatism:
"[Tihe Nice agreement redistributes voting powers, restricts vetoes,
reforms the European Commission and allows closer co-operation
between countries that want to move faster than the rest."10 Even
though these institutional reforms were fewer than many wanted, the
larger significance of "the longest and most difficult summit conference
in the history of the European Union'
lay in the agreement on
measures clearing the last obstacles to enlargement. 12 The European
Union now optimistically predicts the welcoming of the newest

lend fresh impetus to the process." Presidency Conclusions, supra note 3, at 1. On the
Summit's second day, the leaders revised the text of the conclusions to include special
support for the accessions, expressing hope that the applicants would be members in time
to participate in the June 2004 Parliamentary elections. Peter Norman, EU to Speed
Entry of Ex-Soviet Bloc Countries,FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at 1.
7.
A Treat From Nice, supra note 2, at 18.
8.
James, supranote 3, at 1.
9.
Peter Norman et aL, Nice Treaty Comes UnderAttack, FIN. TIMES. Dec. 12,
2000 at 1 (The national vetoes remained in "key areas of national interest, such as
taxation, social security, immigration and asylum regulations."); John Vinocur, Europe
Without Direction,HERALD TRIB., Dec. 12, 2000, at 1 (stating that the treaty "rejiggers
details of [EU] organization but fails one more time to bring the EU a sense of unified
power or direction."). The Treaty was widely criticized for its lack of reforms. See, e.g.,
Suzanne Daley, European.Union Reform: After 5Days, a Yawn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,2000,
at A8 (criticizing the conference and Treaty).
10.
DivorceAfterAll These Years? Not Quite but.... EcoNOMIST, Jan. 27. 2001 at
49. Vddrine continued: "[Bly definition, a compromise, but one that is democratic and
positive." Id.
11.
Roy Denman, So Much for Nice, Now Hope Belgium Will Get Change Rolling,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 14, 2000, at 12; see also Peter Conradi & Eben Black, Leak.
Reveals Bitter Feudingat Nice Summit, SUNDAY TIES, Dec. 17, 2000, at 4 (stating that
"[a] leaked account of the last session in the early hours of Monday morning.., gave a
dramatic insight into the bitterness behind the scenes at the longest such meeting in the
EU's history.").
12.
Chirac Presents Results of French EU Stewardship to Parliament,AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 12,2000 (stating that the "marathon summit" in the French Riviera
city was the highlight of France's presidency of the EU, and it "cleared the way for the
[EU]'s historic eastward expansion... and finally heal the wounds of the long Cold War.).
See alsoPeter Norman et al., European ParliamentMay Reject BeleagueredNice Deal, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 12,2000, at 1. "[The treaty was widely welcomed in the capitals ofcandidate
members in eastern Europe for removing the last legal obstacles to enlargement." Id.
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applicants by 2004.13 British Prime Minister Tony Blair characterized it
14
as "an important turning point for Europe.'
The acceleration of eastward accession in the face of many potential
political obstacles must be considered momentous. 15 The enlargement of
the European Union from its present fifteen Member States to twenty' 16
five and beyond "is a development of truly historic proportions:'
quantitatively by increasing its land mass enormously and qualitatively
by putting "a seal on the reunification of the two sides of Europe" and
17
radically changing the political map of the previous half century.
When the massive enlargement is combined with the common currency,
an expanding common foreign policy, and the new rapid reaction defense
force, the "imposing new shape on the global stage" becomes more
apparent.18
Leaders of the Central and Eastern European applicants welcomed
the Summit's conclusions as a sign that enlargement will be
implemented. 19 The Bulgarian Prime Minister proclaimed that the
summit "nullified the historic Yalta conference which split Europe" into
east and west after World War J1.20 Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgium
prime minister and negotiator at the Summit, hailed the decisions as
21
signaling that enlargement could proceed "in a serious manner."
Bringing the applicant countries into concrete contemplation, the
Member States at the summit allocated the proposed voting authority of
the applicants "in a powerfully symbolic step. ' 22 Poland was allocated
twenty-seven votes in the qualified majority voting arrangement,
Romania fourteen, Czech Republic twelve, Hungary twelve, Bulgaria
ten, Slovakia seven, Lithuania seven, Latvia four, Slovenia four, Estonia

13.
So That's All Agreed, Then, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 23.
14.
Agreement Reached at CrucialEU Enlargement Summit, supra note 5.
15.
Commentators overworked the adjectives, see, for example, "historic,"
"milestone," and "great" supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text, but few will question the
Summit's watershed character if enlargement succeeds across the continent.
16.
Krenzler, supra note 1, at 1.
17.
Id. See also Roger Cohen, More a Loop Than a Knot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2000 at Al, A3 (stating that the fall of long-time Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic
escalates hopes for the long-awaited "Europe whole and free," but this view overlooks the
continuing, acute division in Cyprus).
18.
A Treat From Nice, supra note 2, at 18.
19.
Stefan Wagstyl, Future Members Welcome Outcome, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000,
at 2 (stating that the chief Czech negotiator for accession explained that "it is most
important that the road to enlargement is now clear."). The Polish Prime Minister termed
the outcome "exceptionally positive." Daley, supra note 9, at AS.
20.

Nice Brings Bulgaria in From the Cold says Prime Minister, AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, Dec. 12, 2000. Prime Minister Ivan Kostov was enthusiastic: "[w]ith yesterday's
decision, Bulgaria has joined the European political arena," thus unifying the east and
west for the first time since World War II. Id.
21.

Peter Norman, Belgian PM's Altruism "Heroic,"FIN.TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at

22.

The Strained European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at A26.

2.
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four, Cyprus four, and Malta three, based generally on population.2 The
balance of the vote allocations was striking in that, for example,
newcomer Romania will enjoy more votes than founding Member State
24
Netherlands, which has four times the economy.
Thus, the Nice Summit concretely advanced the aspirations
articulated the previous year in Helsinki. Because those promises made
at Helsinki were in some ways even more dramatic and historic for the
accession of Cyprus, the Nice continuation may be considered doubly
significant. The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999,
was, at the time, celebrated more enthusiastically as "a truly "historic"
summit" 25 because some of its agreements constituted unexpected,
paradigm-shifting2 6 advances in European integration, laying a
foundation for significant progress in important areas of transnational
cooperation 2 7 and most notably breaking the long-standing impasse over
Turkish and Cypriot accession to Europe. 28 In a momentous step toward
fulfilling long-held aspirations for a military dimension, the European
leaders agreed to establish "a new European defense structure," 29

23.
The strenuous negotiating and arguing over the voting power of the applicant
countries surely makes the prospects of enlargement more concrete. Thw Nice Summit,
EcoNoMIsT, Dec. 16, 2000, at 25-26.
24.
The StrainedEuropean Union, supra note 22, at A26. (Furthermore, Poland
will enjoy voting parity with long-time member Spain). Id. As would be expected,
important work is yet to be done for enlargement, including resolving sensitive icsues of
worker movement from the Eastern countries and reform of the wasteful Common
Agricultural Policy. A Treat From Nice, supra,note 2, at 18.
25.
Peter Norman & Christopher Brown-Humes, Presidency Congratulatedfor
Truly '"istoric"Summit,FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 4 (stating that "for once, the word
'historic,' used in successive post-summit briefings, was merited. Decisions taken in
Helsinki will change the EU profoundly."). "Grappling with issues of this magnitude,
Helsinki was in many ways a proper, grown-up summit, at which the EU thought hard
about its place in the world. It did and said some sensible things.... If the EU goes on
like this, it risks counting for something in the world." The European Union Decides It
Might One Day Talk Turkey, ECONOMfsT, Dec. 16, 1999, at 26.
26.
See BringingTurkey Into Europe,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,1999. atA32. Helsinkf's
decision on Turkish acceptance "is one of those developments that mark a historic step
beyond restrictive old rivalries and power alignments." Id.
27.
See infra 28-29 references to the Common European Policy on Security and
Defense. See also Presidency Conclusion at the Helsinki European Council Dec. 10-11,
1999, II, Millennium Declaration, Annex I.
28.
Kerin Hope, Greece: DramaticShift in Relations Between Old Enemiez, FN .
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at 1. ("It would be hard to imagine a more dramatic sluft takang
place in relations between the old enemies Greece and Turkey... with Greece's chances of
building a normal relationship with Turkey... improved by the successful decoupling of
Cyprus from... bilateral issues," [and] "[t]he EU's declaration at Helsinki making it
possible for Cyprus to achieve accession without a political settlement" and "Turkey's EU
candidacy approved at last.").
29.
Craig R. Whitney, MilitaryPostureof Europe to Turn More Independent,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at Al. The new European defense structure would include a military
committee of national defense chiefs to advise European leaders, and would include the
same sixty thousand troops earmarked for use with NATO when appropriate. Id. French
Defense Minister Alain Richard observed: "Now the European Union is stepping up to its
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including a military force of sixty thousand, capable of operating
independently of NATO to act in emergencies such as the one presented
in Kosovo in 1998.30 Further, the group formally advanced the accession
process of the second wave of six additional candidate countries, joining
the six already negotiating. 31 In the most dramatic breakthrough, the
leaders found common ground on the thorny issues surrounding the
accessions of Turkey and Cyprus, agreeing at last to accept Turkey as a
candidate for future membership, 32 thus breaking the impasse over
Cyprus' accession as well. 33 The decision was immediately proclaimed
an "historic step"3 4 into a "new chapter of history. ' 35 "[Aifter 36 years of
temporizing," the leaders finally managed to negotiate the difficult and
complicated issues between Greece and Turkey, thus presenting the
opportunity for Cyprus to again move toward entry into the European
36
Union.
In fact, sensational political maneuvering presaged the deal for
Turkey and Cyprus: First, French President Jacques Chirac, moved by a
Greek change of position and statement of commitment to Europe,
intervened to overcome Dutch resistance to the accession of a divided
Cyprus, and an agreement followed; then Javier Solana, the EU's High
Representative for Foreign Policy, was dispatched to Ankara late in the
evening on Chirac's presidential jet to persuade Turkey's Prime Minister

responsibilities and over the next few years will become a genuine actor on the scene, one
that didn't exist before." Id.
30.
During the Kosovo operations, "it became clear that Europe was lagging in the
ability to assemble or transport sizable peacekeeping forces quickly, and was in danger of
falling far behind advanced American military technology...." Craig R. Whitney, Military
Posture of Europe to Turn More Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at Al.
31.
Edmund L. Andrews, Growing Pains for an Expanding EU, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 21, 1999, at 18. The accessions would yield the "highest and most diversified
free-trade zone in the world," including first wave Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Cyprus, and Estonia, and then ultimately on an indeterminate, flexible timetable
including Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Malta. Id.
32.
Barry James, ConditionalEUBid to Turkey, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 11-12,
1999, at 1. "The European Union accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership on
Friday [Dec. 10, 1999], but imposed tough conditions and set no date for entry talks to
begin." Id. The decision on Turkey was by far "the trickiest," made conditional on
progress over longstanding conflicts, such as cooperation over Cyprus. Dick Leonard,
FinnishPresidencyEnds in Success, EUROPE, Feb. 2000, at 4. For extensive examination
of the Turkish exclusion from accession negotiations, see Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of
Turkey in Europe: Reconsideringthe Luxembourg Exclusion, 23 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 606
(2000).
33.
See Presidency Conclusions, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34.
Turkey and Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 14, 1999, at 8.
35.
European Commission President, Romano Prodi, proclaimed that the Summit
decisions to admit Turkey and the other new Central and Eastern European candidates
represented a "new chapter in history." Barry James, EU Opens a "New Chapter"ofBroad
Expansion, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 13, 1999, at 1.
36.
The European UnionDecidesIt Might One Day Talk Turkey, ECONOMIST, Dec.
18, 1999, at 25. The EU leaders were at last "ready to do the sensible thing and accept
Turkey as a candidate for membership." Id.
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Bulent Ecevit to accept the offer.3 7 In the end, agreement was achieved
and was immediately heralded as a change in policy with "profound
consequences for stability and prosperity in the region ....[that] could
38
transform the character of the EU."
This Article will examine this intersection of events in the context of
Cyprus' process toward accession as a new member of the European
Union and its significance as a member, especially in light of its strategic
location between East and West.3 9 The Article will argue that the
present developments, political and otherwise, attempting to bridge the
age-old antagonisms between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, are
deceptively significant, presenting an unusual moment of opportunity for
breaking the present impasse and promoting a climate of collaboration
in the region. The Article rejects as unworkable the present EU strategy
that the island may accede with its present division, and it proposes a
more realistic model for functional cooperation on the island. Past,
unproductive strictures of international law and EU policy should adapt
to the reality of the two communities on Cyprus to enable them to break
through the status quo and to begin building toward a broader, longer
term resolution of this historical dilemma. The political and legal actors
must embrace constructive, flexible approaches to this impasse,
borrowing and further adapting new forms of shared sovereignty and
balanced political power currently advancing EU and other regional
40
cooperative regimes.
This conflict will not wither away under the stale pressures already
brought to bear. As long as this stand-off dominates the political and

37.
Quentin Peel, Little is left to chance in Turkey's bid for Europe. FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1999, at 16. See also Peter Norman et al., Solana Tries to Clear Turkey's Path to
EU Candidacy, FIN. TIIES, Dec. 1112, 1999, at 1.

U.S. President Bill Clinton

simultaneously telephoned Ecevit, urging acceptance of the offer. Id.
38.
Europe Opens Its Doors, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999. at 18.
39.
The only major island in the eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus has been prized
for centuries. See, e.g., Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus, the 'Warlike Isle:" Originsand Eleinents
of the CurrentCrisis,18 STAN. L. REv. 1021, 1021 (1966) (stating that Cyprus has been the
source of on-going conflict for centuries). Cyprus possesses enormous significance as a
bridge to the Middle East, both practical and symbolic, and as a Member State of the EU,
would advance European security interests and peacemaking initiatives in the region. See
JOSEPHS. JOSEPH, CYPRUS: ETHNIC CONFLICTAND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2d ed. 1997)
123 (stating that Cyprus would contribute to a united Europe because of its strategic

location). The eastern Mediterranean "is a flashpoint in world pohtics and thus an ever.
present concern. . . ." A.J.R. GROOM, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, A Treadmill for
Diplomacy, in CYPRUS IN TRANSITION 1960-1985 127 (John TA. Koumoulides ed., 1986).

40.

Borrowing successful experiences from other legal system can be fruitful. See

Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 345 (1996) (giving the

example of the use of Roman law). Comparativists should work in today's multicultural
world to reduce "prejudice and stereotyped notions of other cultures and legal systems...
to use the comparative mirror to promote community rather than disunity." Nora V.
Demleitner, CombatingLegal Ethnocentrism: ComparativeLaw Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 737, 737-39. The divisions of Cyprus could only be lessened by embracing new
models.
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legal discourse of the region, eastern enlargement of the European
Union will be distorted. Leaders should understand that Cyprus is not
just any other accession applicant. 41 '"The future of Europe is intimately
joined to the future of Islam" 42 because of the millions of Muslims living
in Europe and the effect of present and potential Islamic-oriented
governments on the periphery of Europe. 43 Cyprus, with its intense
legal conflict magnified by geography and current events, can be seen as
the paradigmatic intersection between East and West, offering a critical
and opportune venue for exploration of new models of political problem
44
solving and collaboration.

II. CENTURIES OF CONFLICT
In recorded history, the island of Cyprus has never enjoyed a
peaceful, stable sovereign state. 45 In many ways, the island has been a
victim of its geography. 46 Poised opportunely at the intersection of three
continents, the only significant island along the eastern Mediterranean

41.
This is true not only in opportunity it offers to the European Union, but also in
difficulty of harmonizing a divided state into the European Union. Cyprus' "application for
EC membership from a divided state is unique." JOHN REDMOND, THE NEXT
MEDITERRANEAN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: TURKEY, CYPRUS AND
MALTA 62 (1993).
42.
LARRY SIEDENTOP, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 207 (2000).
43.
The Palestinian Intifada in 2000-01 illustrates the increasing Islamic influence
in world affairs. Roula Khalaf, Islam Renews Its Relevance, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at
13.
44.
Armin Von Bogdandy, A Bird's Eye View on the Science of European Law:
Structures, Debates, and Development Prospects of Basic Research on the Law of the
European Union in a GermanPerspective, 6 EUR. L.J. 208, 209 (2000). If,
it is the primary function of legal scholarship as a practical discipline to attend to
an important social 'infrastructure' by establishing and maintaining law's
coherence and proposing practical solutions for legal conflicts, few legal conflicts so
merit attention as the anachronistic military stand-off dividing two separate
polities on the geographical territory of EU-applicant Cyprus.
Id.
45.
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1021. Exhaustive historical accounts have been
written by respected scholars, most notably the classic four volume set: SIR GEORGE HILL,
A HISTORY OF CYPRUS (1949), and the more recent work H.D. PURCELL, CYPRUS (1968).
This Article's brief historical sketch recounts only the significant events and themes
relevant to the island's long-standing conflicts underlying today's political impasse.
46.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 15. "[Its] favourable position, within such easy reach
of Syria, Turkey, and Egypt, has often been more of a curse than a boon - a problem that
persists up to the present day." CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HOSTAGE TO HISTORY: CYPRUS
FROM THE OTTOMANS TO KISSINGER 29 (1997). See also Europe Opens Its Doors, supranote
38 and accompanying text.
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trade routes, 47 "[ilts strategic location, long exposed coastline, and small

size always made it an attractive and easy target for outsiders."48
Cyprus has always been a bloody battleground. It was conquered by
Egypt, colonized by Greece, and annexed by Rome before the first century
A.D., and for the next two thousand years a succession of absentee
landlords ruled its shores. The strength and wisdom of their dominion
varied, but not their basic purpose-hegemony over the Eastern
Mediterranean by controlling its major island command post. From before
the Byzantine era through successive occupations by Richard the
Lionhearted, the Templars, Franks, Venetians, Turks, and British, Cyprus
49
has been passed with abandon among ruling powers.

That ruinous tradition of conflict continues today, as the armed
standoff in Cyprus presents a divided island with the world's only
remaining divided capital city, Nicosia.50 As intractable as the postcolonial conflicts in Palestine or Ireland, the conflict between the two
sides of the island has resolutely resisted mediations and other
interventions by world leaders.5 1
Much of the present-day conflict in Cyprus can be traced to the
religious and ethnic divisions in the region, which are manifested so
visibly in the Christian-Islamic conflict and have been exploited by
conquering empires.5 2 Cyprus has been inhabited by people of Greek
descent since the late thirteenth century, B.C., when the Mycenean

47.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 88.
48.
JOSEPH, supranote 39, at 15. The island has an area of 3572 square miles. Id.
It lies forty-four miles south of Turkey, sixty-four miles west of Syria, and 240 miles north
of Egypt. Id. at 58.
49.
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1021. "Few countries in the world have been
subjected to the degree of violence that has plagued Cyprus throughout most of its known
existence." ANDREW BOROWIEC, CYPRUS: A TROUBLED ISLAND 11 (2000). The unusually
rapid and continuous succession of invasions, atrocities, plagues, floods, earthquakes, reinvasions, and atrocities anew, century after century, are portrayed vividly in the classic
texts of this island's history. See Von Bogdandy, supranote 44, at 209.
50.
Letter From Nicosia- On Ciuilization'sFaultLine, ECONOMIsT. June 20, 1998,
at 99.
51.
One of the "impenetrable, hardy perennial" conflicts of the modern world. A bit
of respect please, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1998, at 17. For over thirty years, settlement
proposals and negotiations have involved the UN, the Guarantor Powers, the United
States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, leading to today's stalemate. David Wippman
InternationalLaw andEthnic Conflict in Cyprus, 31 TEX. INTL L.J. 141, 165 (1996). See
also REDMOND, supra note 41, at 62 (stating that "the division of Cyprus presents one of
those intractable problems in which bitter historical memory has superseded the desire of
its peoples for a harmonious future.") (quoting R. McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, in
ADELPHI PAPER 234, BRASSEYS FORTHEINTERNATIONALIN'STTUTEOFSTRATEGIcAFFAiRs,
LONDON 3 (1998-99)).
52.
Over centuries, the mentality ofclassifying people by religion, with its intrinsic
cultural reflection, led to wars centered on religion. PIERRE OBERLING, THE ROAD TO
BELLAPAIs, THE TURKISH CYPRIOT EXODUS TO NORTHERN CYPRUS 9 (1982). 'The ethnic
and intra-ethnic aspects of the [Cyprus] conflict have been manipulated by outsiders
looking to advance their own interests." FEN OSLER HAMPsON, NURTURING PEACE, WHY
PEACE SETITLEMENTS FAIL 35 (1996).
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Greeks invaded and colonized the island. 53 The troubled history of the
island is, in large measure, the story of their descendants' struggle with
subsequent invaders for control of the island. In fact, for eight centuries
from 1192 until 1960, no ruler of the island spoke Greek, the language of
54
the vast majority of the population.
Religion has compounded the conflict. Christianity was introduced
into Cyprus in the first century.55 The Apostle Paul advanced the
religion by converting the Roman Proconsul, and the religion slowly
spread across the island and was declared the official religion of the
entire Roman Empire in 333.56 Following the east-west division of the
Roman Empire in 395, Cyprus fell under the rule of Byzantium.5 7 The
next two centuries were marked by prosperity58 and by the sixth
59
century, A.D., Christianity reigned supreme.
Beginning in the mid-seventh century, Cyprus suffered three
centuries of Arab raids and occupations that were often accompanied by
mass slaughter, enslavement, and exaction of tribute. 60 During this
period, the island became "a no-man's land between two warring
worlds."'i In 689, the competing Christian and Moslem empires agreed
to split revenues from the island, 62 but Emperor Justinian II, not
content with that arrangement, largely depopulated the island by
transporting many of its inhabitants, mostly Christian Greeks, to the
shores of the Propontis-the modern Sea of Marmara-to deny the
Moslems their share of the tribute. 63 In 743, Caliph Valid II carried off
many Cypriots to Syria,6 4 and in 806, Caliph Harun-ar-Rashid sold
sixteen thousand captured Cypriots into slavery. 65 Such repeated
incursions were typical during these three hundred years, and it is
unclear who controlled the island and for how long. 66 What is clear is

that

53.
PURCELL, supranote 45, at 79. "Between 411 and 374 B.C.... Cyprus became
a thriving cultural and economic center of the Hellenic world, eventually joining several
expeditions of Alexander the Great and becoming part of the Ptolemaic empire."
BOROWIEC, supra note 49, at 14.
54.
HITCHENS, supra note 46, at 29.
55.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 104. The Early Roman Period began in 58 B.C.
when the island was taken by the Romans. Id. at 100.
56.
Id. at 104-06.
57.

DOROS ALASTOS, CYPRUS IN HISTORY 116 (1955).

58.
See PURCELL, supra note 45, at 109 (outlining the entrenchment of
Christianity).
59.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 121.
60.
Id. at 124-29. A sixteenth century historian, Stephan de Lusignan, reported
that Cyprus suffered no fewer than twenty-four Arab invasions. Id.
61.
Id. at 129.
62.
HILL, supra note 45, at 286-88.
63.
Id.
64.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 127.
65.
HILL, supra note 45, at 293.
66.
See PURCELL, supra note 45, at 111-14.

20011

CYPRUS IN EUROPE

1303

neither side was for long the complete master of the island; that both sides
ruled at times concurrently; that both collected taxes, when they could;
that the treaty of 689, ... was constantly violated and yet constantly
invoked by both; and that the people lived for three centuries in a grey
twilight world of uncertainty and oppression with the threat of death.
torture and hanging permanently over their heads. The end of the period
found Cyprus an exhausted and ruined land with a population enormously
67
reduced.

Byzantine rule would eventually prevail in this struggle and become
secure on the island in 965.68 The age of the crusades followed, and in
1156, Cyprus was invaded by the Franks and Armenians who repeated
the all-too-familiar pillaging and looting of previous centuries. 69
Byzantine rule during this period was also punctuated by local revolts. 70
The last, led by Isaac Ducas Commenos in 1184, succeeded in freeing
Cyprus from the Byzantine Emperor Andronicos' despotic rule.7 1 Yet,
72
Isaac's rule was similarly marked by tyranny.
This oppression continued until Cyprus was conquered by Richard
the Lion Heart in 1191 while en route to the Third Crusade. 73 Storms
shipwrecked several ships of Richard's fleet on Cypriot shores, where the
crews were captured and imprisoned by Isaac. 74 Richard feared that
Isaac contemplated capturing and ransoming Richard's sister, Joanna,
and his bride-to-be, Berengaria of Navarre, when their ship was also
forced to Cyprus by a storm.75 Richard invaded, conquered the island,
and demanded half the wealth of its inhabitants in retribution. 76 After
Richard left with his booty, the population again revolted, prompting
77
Richard to sell the island to the Templar Knights.

The Templars continued to oppress a resentful populace, 78 and in
the face of a general uprising, they soon abandoned the island back to
Richard. 79 Richard subsequently resold the island to the French

67.
ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 132.
68.
PETERW. EDBURY, THEKINGDOM OFCYPRUSANDTHE CRUSADES, 1191-1374 2
(1991).
69.
ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 142-44 (including informative descriptions of the
motivations for and destructive results of the Crusades, from religious fanaticism to the
thirst for wealth and territory).
70.
ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 138-39.
71.
EDBURY, supra note 68, at 3.
72.
ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 141.
73.
See generally HILL, supra note 45, at 318-21 (describing Richard's conquest of
Cyprus).
74.
EDBURY, supranote 68, at 5-6.
75.
Id. Richard and Beringaria were married on Cyprus, in the Chapel of St.
George, and thus, a Queen of England was crowned in Cyprus. HILL, supra note 45, at
319.
76.
ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 150.
77.
Id.
78.
See HILL, supranote 45, at 36-37. During the period of Latin dominationtwelfth through sixteenth centuries---"the Cypriots had been reduced to a state of complete
serfdom." PIERRE OBERLING, THE ROAD TO BELLAPAIS 2 (1982).
79.
See PURCELL, supra note 45, at 120.
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crusader Guy de Lusignan, 80 who established a French-speaking feudal
state maintaining the local population as slaves, serfs, and tenant
farmers. 8 ' The Lusignan hold of the island was generally secure and
"no tribute was being sent abroad for the first time in twelve hundred
82

years."
The dynasty would decline as Italian influence in the region
ascended. The Lusignans granted trading rights to the Genoese in 1218
and to the Venetians in 1306, accompanied by grants of limited
83
autonomy over the traders' settlements in Cypriot port cities.
Unfortunately, Genoa and Venice were bitter rivals, and in 1371 a
dispute erupted into several days of violence during which the Venetians
killed many Genoese. 84 When the Lusignan ruler refused to compensate
the Genoese, they attacked and, after several months of savage fighting,
85
pillaged Famagusta and Nicosia.
Subsequently, the Genoese became the de facto power in Cyprus.8 6
By this time, Cyprus was a weakened state and soon fell prey to another
Egyptian invasion in 1426.87 Lusignan King Janus was captured, as the
Egyptians swept in to Nicosia, only to depart some days later in a path of
death and destruction.8" Alarmed leaders of the West-Genoa, Venice,
Rome, and others-ransomed the humiliated king, who returned to
Cyprus "broken in spirit and in health."89 "With the administration in a
state of paralysis, the Greek peasantry of Cyprus, which for nearly 250
years had suffered all the indignities and exactions inherent in serfdom,
thought the opportunity had arrived to shake off the yoke." 90 Like
previous revolts, however, the insurrection was savagely crushed by
King Janus' better armed and disciplined troops. 9 1 Janus' successor,
John II, married a devoutly Greek Orthodox woman and a member of
the Imperial family in Constantinople. 92 John's wife, Helena, obtained
control of the affairs of state and was appointed Regent of the

80.
From 1192 until 1489, he and his descendants ruled the island, commonly
known as the Lusignan Period. ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 154-67.
81.
Id. at 157-60.
82.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 120-21.
83.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 163-70.
84.

EDBURY, supra note 68, at 200.

85.
HILL, supra note 45, at 390-400.
86.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 202. They failed to expel the Cypriots from
Kerynia, on the northern coast. HILL, supra note 45, at 406-07.
87.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 202. The Egyptian attack is said to have been
encouraged by the Genoese. HILL, supra note 45, at 475.
88.
Janus was humiliated before the Sultan, forced to ride bareback on a lame ass,
kiss the ground repeatedly, and otherwise humbled. See generally HILL, supra note 45,
480-87 (describing the capture of King Janus and the destruction that followed).
89.
HILL, supra note 45, at 491.
90.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 205.
91.
Id. at 205-06.
92.
Id.
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Kingdom. 9 3 Helena began a concerted effort to Hellenise the
administration of the government, injecting a long-awaited stimulus to
Greek culture on Cyprus. 94 Through her efforts the Greek Cypriot
dialect became an official language of the island.9 5 Hopes arose that the
Regent's relation with the Imperial family in Constantinople might lead
96
to unification with Byzantium.
Even as the Greek Cypriot spirit ascended, however, the future of
Lusignan Cyprus remained threatened; foreigners still held major ports,
the Egyptians were still overlords, and new threats appeared from Asia
Minor.9 7 Soon the illegitimate son of the King, known as James the
Bastard, conspired with the Egyptian Sultan, attacked with an Egyptian
convoy, and conquered the island.9 8 The Venetians, concerned about the
rising Ottoman power, supported James,9 9 and he welcomed the
protection of Venice over the island in 1474.100 Upon James' death,

Venetian Councillors dictated in the Queen's name. 10 1 In 1489, Venice
formally annexed Cyprus and exercised eighty years of domination. i 2
The sixteenth century advances of the Ottomans, from Algeria to
the Caucasus, made clear that "a major assault on Cyprus was only a
matter of time."1 0 3 The Turkish fleet arrived in 1570,104 and the entire
island was subjugated by the following year. 105
The Turks held the island under their rule for three centuries, and
during this time, many Turks settled on the island, sometimes
numbering almost as many as the Greeks. 0 6 The Ottomans allowed the
Greek Cypriot community a form of self-government, permitting the
Greek Orthodox Church to regulate social and religious affairs, even
while they denied Cypriots political rights.10 7 As was their custom, the
Ottomans administered the island under their millet system, which
distinguished communities throughout the Ottoman empire on the basis
of ethnicity and religion.1 08 Although not physically separated, Greeks
93.
HILL, supranote 45, at 528. This was a strong woman, whose court was known
for intrigue and even assassination. Id. at 529.
94.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 208.
95.
The Greek Cypriot dialect became an official language along with French. Id.
96.
Id. at 207-08. These hopes were crushed with the fall of the city to the Turks
in 1453. Id.
97.
Id at 209.
98.
Id- at 210-13.
99.
PURCELL, supranote 45, at 145.
100. ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 215.
101.
HILL, supra note 45, at 766.
102. Id at 767.
103.
PURCELL, supranote 45, at 149.
104. Id. at 163.
105. ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 163-70, 242.
106. ZAIM M. NECATIGIL, THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE TURKiSH POSITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 1996).

107. ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 263. This church role in self.government fostered
cohesion of the ethnic Greek population. NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 1.
108. JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 17.
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and Turks were divided culturally and administratively, as taxes were

collected with the assistance of religious institutions. 10 9 As a result of
the millet system, the Greek community came to recognize the Greek
Orthodox Church as the center of political and cultural life and the
archbishop as its spiritual and secular leader.1 10 That Ottoman system
of divided governance sowed the seeds for the modern-day bi-communal
system of governance in which Turkish and Greek Cypriots steadfastly
maintain their separate national identities,"' separate educational
systems, separate languages, and distinct religious cultures, and in
2
which the two sides jealously protect against cultural interchange."
Ottoman rule over Cyprus would last from 1571 until 1878, and the
period was marked generally by "growing decay and impoverishment,"
but also by harsh rule, revolt, and brutal suppression." 3 Significant in
foreshadowing future conflict were the Turkish atrocities on the island
and the rising movement for enosis with Greece." 4 A wave of terror was
instituted on the island following the 1821 anti-Turkish revolt in Greece,
designed to prevent its spread to Cyprus. The Turkish regime executed
most of the Greek Cypriot leaders in public, accompanied by widespread
looting of churches and houses. 5
A few religious leaders had escaped to Rome, from which they
"issued a manifesto for the liberation of Cyprus,"" 6 but with no real
results: "Cyprus was a distant land. Its tragedy hardly found an echo in
the West."" 7 In the many battles of this period around Cyprus among
competing powers in the region-the British, the Egyptians, and

109.
110.
west with
111.
112.

See id.
Id. (discussing how the Ottomans replaced the Roman Catholic Church ofthe
the more amenable Greek Orthodox Church of the east).
Wippman, supra note 51, at 142.
See JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 16.

The Greek Cypriots speak Greek and identify with the Greek nation, Greek
culture, and the fheritage of classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire. Almost
all of them are members of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus ...a member of the
Greek Eastern Orthodox Church. The Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish and
identify with the Turkish nation, Turkish culture, and the heritage of the Turkish
Ottoman Empire. Virtually all of them are Muslims of the Sunni sect.
Id. For further treatment of these historical roots of division, see Floya Anthias & Ron
Ayres, Ethnicity and Class in Cyprus, in RACE AND CLASS (1983).
113.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 259-97.
114.
See generally PURCELL, supra note 45 (describing the movement of
Constantine Rhigas in the 1780s in Bucharest encouraging Hellenism and enosis in all the
lands with Greek descendants).
115.
See PURCELL, supra note 45, at 192-94. Some Greek Cypriot money and
volunteers had supported the 1821 revolt in Greece, and "the Turkish authorities had, by
way of example, hanged the Greek Orthodox bishop of the island in public." HITCHENS,
supra note 46, at 32. Reports of executions by "hanging, impalement, and strangling" in
previous Turkish punishments explain that "similar punishments were in use in the
West." PURCELL, supra note 45, at 190-91.
116.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 194.
117.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 293.
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others-only a few unsuccessful attempts were made to take advantage
of the island's instability.1 18 Yet, in 1830, a new leader in Greece
advocated union with Cyprus, 119 and "substantial sentiment was voiced
on the Island for... enosis."'120 Three more revolts, which had enosist
elements, 121 occurred between 1830 and 1833, but were repressed "with
the usual Ottoman harshness, with the troops committing every kind of
1 22
atrocity and outrage against both guilty and innocent."
In this latter period, external events were combining to set the
stage for a final colonial ruler of Cyprus. Turkey's loss in 1774 of the
Crimea and much of its treasury in the war with Russia was followed by
a general decline and diminished Mediterranean trade.' 2 3 In this
vulnerable position, as the century changed and with Russia looming as
a constant threat to the north, Turkey faced a new menace, as the major
Western powers concluded the Napoleonic wars and turned their
attention eastward towards the weakened Ottoman empire.124 Russia,
France, and Britain had supported the Greek fight for independence
against the Turks; all had interests to promote or protect in the
125
region.
The Russo-Turkish War introduced a new epoch in the history of
Cyprus. 126 With Russia again threatening Turkey, the Turks looked to
Britain for support, and maintaining the Turkish "counterpoise to
Russia" served vital British interests. 127 "[jWith the Tsarist armies at
the gates of Istanbul .... "128 Turkey granted administrative control of
the island to Great Britain in return for British assistance against

118.

See PURCELL, supra note 45, at 194. For a brief explanation of the period of

interlocking alliances following Napoleon's defeat in 1815 and how their subsequent
unraveling centered on the Ottoman Empire, see ALASrOS, supra note 57, at 286.
119.
PURCELL, supranote 45, at 194 (noting Count Capo d'Istria's desire for enosis).
120.
Ehrlich, supranote 39, at 1025 (emphasis added). After 1830, "[pressure for
enosis built up steadily and unremittently in the next century." Id. The advance of the
secular ideas of the Enlightment, a growing pride in the ancient Greeks. and the wave of
nationalism that followed the Napoleonic wars contributed to the rising resistance to
Turkish authority. OBERLING, supranote 52, at 9; see also Anthias & Ayres, supra note
112, at 60-65 (providing for a detailed description of nineteenth and tventieth century
ethnic and religious divisions, the rise of nationalism, and the formation of political parties
advocating enosis).
121.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 195.
122.
ALASTOS, supranote 57, at 296.
123.
BOROWIEC, supra note 49, at 18.
124.
Id. The Napoleonic wars made evident the importance of Cyprus to sea power,
and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further enhanced Cyprus' strategic position.
PURCELL, supranote 45, at 198.
125.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 197-99 (identifying long-time French commercial
and political interests, Britain's sea trade to India, and Russian expansionism and
antipathy toward Turkey).
126.
HILL, supranote 45, at 262.
127.
Id. at 277, 269-78 (containing a full description of British policy concerns in the
Levant).
128.
NECATIGIL, supranote 106, at 3.
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Russia. 129 Turkey retained nominal suzerainty of the island, 130 but
when Turkey allied with Germany at the beginning of the first World
War, Britain assumed full claim to the island. 13 1 Following the Axis
defeat, both Turkey and Greece recognized British sovereignty over
132
Cyprus under the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
Britain instituted a modern administrative system, but perpetuated
ethnic separation by maintaining the religious, education, and cultural
divisions of the millet system. 133 As Greek Cypriot interest in enosis
developed steadily through this period, the Turkish Cypriots "looked
suspiciously on, finding themselves, the former masters, now relegated
in British dominated Cyprus to playing the part of a largely peasant and
bureaucratic minority .... ,,134
Cyprus was named a Crown Colony in 1925, but soon thereafter
economic grievances and desire for enosis generated insurrection against
British rule. 135 In reaction, the British abolished the representative
136
institutions and "ruled as a bureaucratic autocracy."'
Greek Cypriot demands for enosis with Greece intensified to the
point that demonstrations and riots became commonplace in the 1930s
and 1940s.137 In response, many of the Turkish Cypriots campaigned for
taksim, or partition of the communities, 3 8 and Turkish support of the

129.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 144. The Sultan received both tribute and
England's help against Russia, but Cyprus was intended to revert to Turkish power after
Turkey regained certain territories in Armenia. See The Convention of Defensive Alliance
Between Great Britain and Turkey With Respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, Juno
4, 1878, art. I, 153 Consol. T.S. 68-73. British statesman William Gladstone described the
1878 Cyrpus Convention "[which embodied spurious guarantees for the Sultan against
Tsarist oppression] as 'an act of duplicity not surpassed and rarely equalled in the annals
of nations."' HITCHENS, supra note 46, at 32. Legal theorists have complained that
England did not live up to many of the commitments regarding Cyprus, and Britain
annexed the island at the outset of World War I. Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1025.
130.
IOANNIS D. STEFANDIS, ISLE OFDIScORD: NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISMAND THE
MAKING OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 1 (1999).
131.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 144.
132.
Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, art. 20, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, 25.
133.
Reports on the millet system's magnification of the religious and ethnic
divisions on Cyprus are many. See supra text accompanying notes 118-24.
134.
CLEMENT H. DODD, A Historical Overview, in CYPRUS: THE NEED FOR NEW
PERSPECTIVES 3-4 (Clement H. Dodd ed., 1999). For general description of the period and
subsequent history from a minister and legal advisor to the TRNC, see N.M. ERTEKUN,
THE CYPRUS DISPUTE AND THE BIRTH OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS
(1981).
135.
STEFANDIS, supra note 130, at 1.
136.
Id.
137.
Ehrlich, supranote 39, at 1026. Popular support for enosis continued to build
to the point that ninety-six percent of the voters favored it in a 1949 plebescite. Id. at
1025-26. Note that during the early British rule, little effort was made to discourage the
predominant association with Greece as the motherland: school books and curriculum
were the same as in Greece, pictures of Greek leaders adorned the schoolroom walls,
Greek flags flew at ceremonies. HILL, supra note 45, at 497.
138.
Michael Schmidt, Aegean Angst: A Historicaland LegalAnalysisof the Greek.
Turkish Dispute, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 15, 22 (1996).
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British repressive measures to stem the enosis agitation exacerbated the
tension.1 3 9 In1931, enosis proponents burned the Governor's house, and
the British abolished the Legislative Council.'40 The unrest abated some
4
during World War H, with most Cypriots favoring the Allies.1 '
Following World War H, demands for self-determination and enosiswere
broadly supported and became an international issue in the treaty
negotiations at the end of the war. 142 When Britain proposed measures
for a more liberal regime for the internal governance of Cyprus
in 1947,
143
the Greeks refused, demanding full union with Greece.
In 1950, the nationalists organized a terrorist group which began a
44
four year campaign of "arson, murder, and intercommunal clashes."
The Turkish Cypriots, adamantly opposing colonization by Greece, soon
formed their own counter-terrorist group. 145 Commentators point to
British policy encouraging Turkish resistance to enosis as a means of
control: a policy that failed in preventing the Greek Cypriot rebellion,
but succeeded in damaging intercommunal relations "severely and
perhaps permanently."'146 "It is an article of faith among Greek Cypriots
that the British used 'divide-and-rule' tactics.

.

." and that view was

widely held and supported by much evidence. 147 Britain encouraged the
taksim movement, for example, by allowing the formation of an explicitly
pro-taksim party, using Turkish Cypriots as special police, and some
think paying for Turks to begin paramilitary activity. 14 8
During the 1950s, Greece openly promoted unification and pressed
the United Nations for "self-determination" of the island. 149 Turkey

139.
140.

THOMAS EHRLICH, CYPRUS 1958-1967 2 (1974).
NECATIGIL, supranote 106, at 5.

141.
HiLL, supranote 45, at 558-60 (explaining that discontent against Britain was
mixed with a sense of support for the Allies and hope that victory would lead to euosis).
142.
ALASTOS, supra note 57, at 368.
143.
There is emotive text of the rejection. See id. at 370-74.
144.
The Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA). NECATIGIL, supra note
106, at 6-7.
145.
This group was known as Volkan. Id. at 7-8. "Periods of uneasy peace
alternated with outbreaks of violence ... EOKA ...was by far the most effective force
against British rule.... VOLKAN conducted a similar campaign of violence against Greek
Cypriots. Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1030.
146.
HITCHENS, supra note 46, at 47 (suggesting that, prior to this period. "there
was no history of internal viciousness in Cyprus.... It was only when the Turks put on
British uniforms to oppose a popular movement that they were shot at by Greeks.-).
Fluctuations in the demographics of Christians and Muslims. including "religious"
conversions and cross-adoption of languages, caused a form of "interhangeability" among
the people, such that "the number of mixed villages... testify to what has been termed
'traditional coexistence.'" Anthias & Ayres, supra note 112, at 60. 'The British were
undoubtedly involved in encouraging a mounting Turkish concern about the position m
Cyprus. . . ." DODD, supranote 134, at 5.
147.
HrrCHENS, supra note 46, at 43.
148.
Anthias & Ayres, supra note 112, at 68-69. As in Suez, Britain was posing as
mediator to advance one side of the dispute. Id. at 45.
149.
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1027. The first Greek mention of the Cyprus problem
in the United Nations was in 1950...." STEPHEN G. XYDIs, CYPRUS, CONFLICT AND
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resisted the campaign, demanding the island's return to Turkey if
Britain withdrew.' 5 0 Extensive UN debate failed to yield consensus, and
fighting on the island continued. 1 1 Between 1955 and 1959, the severity
of the bloody revolt and public opinion pressured Britain to end this
period of destructive governance, and Britain ultimately succumbed to
15 2
the inevitability of a sovereign Cyprus.
That year at Zurich, the governments of Turkey and Greece
negotiated a settlement in the form of three Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance, designed to construct a constitutional system balancing power
between the communities.1 53 With the subsequent ratification of these
agreements by representatives of Britain, Turkey, and Greece, the
54
Republic of Cyprus was created.'
The new compromise government functioned reasonably well for
about two and a half years, but soon old tensions would destabilize the
delicate equilibrium. 55 Even in the newly established country, with its
constitution carefully designed to protect each side's interests,15 6 neither
Turkish nor Greek Cypriot faction was "satisfied with its share of

CONCILIATION, 1954 -1958 7 (1967) (detailing the fight for Cypriot self-determination and
independence in the UN). "Between 1954 and 1958, Greece resorted to the United Nations
five times over the Cyprus question." Id. at 3. Greece promoted self-determination so that
Cyprus could become independent and then, through enosis, a part of Greece. Id. at 4-5.
150.
DODD, supra note 134, at 5.
151.
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1026-28, 1030-31.
152.
Britain's own Labor Party began promoting Cyprus' right to selfdetermination. Id. at 1030-31. Britain was gradually losing its position as a Middle
Eastern power and was confronting anticolonial, nationalist movements, as the loss "of the
Suez Canal in 1956, the Iraqi revolution, and the Lebanese civil strife in 1958 dealt severe
blows to British prestige in the region." LINDA B. MILLER, CYPRUS, THE LAW AND POLITICS
OF CIVIL STRIFE 2 (1968). "Ten years of riot, rebellion and communal strife, interspersed
with intervals of truce, negotiation, and debate in international organizations drew to a
close in 1959 with the British acceptance of an unavoidable change in the sovereignty of
Cyprus." Id. at 3.
153.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 144-45 (citing basic Structure of the Republic of
Cyprus, February 11, 1959, reprinted in ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE 559 (1959)); Treaty of Guarantee,
Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty of Alliance Between the Kingdom of Greece, the
Republic of Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus, Aug. 16, 1960, 397 U.N.T.S. 289). See also
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1031-33 (outlining the process through which agreement was
soon reached among all the parties-Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the soon-to-be-created
Republic of Cyprus-and the various treaties of Alliance and Guaranty known as the
Accords, were signed at Nicosia in August, 1960).
154.
For further details of the Zurich negotiations and the subsequent agreement,
see id. Evidence suggests that the Cypriots had little choice but to accept the Treaty as
the price of independence. Makarios later insisted that he "had no alternative but to sign
the agreement." U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1098th mtg., at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1098 (1964).
155.
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1040.
156.
Post-independence efforts to erect a constitutional structure reflect a
"consociational" approach to accommodate the different communities intermixed in a
single state. NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 17. The resulting 1960 agreements and,
ultimately the Constitution, were intricately designed to establish a constitutional
equilibrium between Greek and Turkish interests. EHRLICH, supra note 139, at 38. See
also infra text accompanying notes 181-86.
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aspirations for
government contror ' 157 and neither gave up its
158

unification with its "respective co-ethnic neighbor."
Unfortunately, the constitution amplified the ethnic conflictic 9 and
"contained the seeds of partition within it."160 It "established
thoroughgoing bi-communalism in all spheres and all levels of
government," 161 creating separate categories of citizenship, separate
municipalities, with separate elections-all based on Turkish or Greek
status-with civil service jobs and seats in the legislature mandatorily
shared in a seventy to thirty percent ratio. 162 The president was
required to be a Greek Cypriot, and the vice president a Turkish Cypriot
"each elected by his own community.., and accountable to them." 163
Significantly, the Turkish-Cypriot vice president held a legislative
164
veto.
Social and cultural practices fortified these divisions in the two
communities as they consciously nurtured their separate subnational
identities. 165 Each community maintained its own educational system,
its own language, its own distinct religious culture, and the two sides
The postjealously protected against cultural interchange. 166
independence efforts to erect a constitutional structure were designed to
accommodate these different communities intermixed in a single
state.167 The resulting agreements and ultimately the constitution were
intricately designed and "incredibly detailed"1 68 to balance the power
169
Yet
and to manage the ethnic conflict between the two communities.
of
the
percent
eighty
constituting
Cypriots,
Greek
the
at the same time,
Turkish
of
minority
the
while
Greece,
with
population, favored uniting
Cypriots fearing domination by the Greeks advocated partition and unity
with Turkey. 170 Greek Orthodox Archbishop Makarios, the island's first
president, soon announced that he had signed the constitutional
agreements under duress, and he reaffirmed the national aim of enosis.

157.

Suzanne Palmer, The Republic of Northern Cyprus: Should the United States

Recognize it as cu Independent State, 4 B.U. L. REV. 423, 434 (1986).
Wippman, supra note 51, at 144. As would be expected, both Greece and
158.
Turkey promoted the efforts to protect their constituents. Id. See also GROOM. supra note
39, at 126 (originally the phrase "respective co-ethnic neighbor.").
Anthias & Ayres, supra note 112, at 71.
159.
HITCHENS, supra note 46, at 49.
160.
Anthias & Ayres, supra note 112, at 70.
161.
162.
Id.
Id. at 71.
163.
HITCHENS, supra note 46, at 49.
164.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 142.
165.
See NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 2 (explaining that there is no
166.
intermarriage, and that each group maintains its own distinct cultural and historical

heritage).
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 17.
EHRUCH, supranote 139, at 38.
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 9.
Wippman, supranote 51, at 144.
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A new struggle thus began, with one side agitating for amendments to
171
the constitution and the other fiercely resisting.
The constitution's strict requirements for the division of government
between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot communities was
understandable in light of the terrorism and violence that had preceded
it, but at the same time this structure reinforced the walls of separation
between them. 172 Functionally, the complex system of constitutional
checks made it possible for the minority to paralyze government, 173 and
disputes continuously arose, ultimately producing gridlock. 174 When the
Greek Cypriots objected to the application of mandatory quotas for filling
civil service positions, Turkish Cypriots blocked passage of important
legislation, including the income tax. 175 In response, Makarios proposed
constitutional revisions that would have diminished the Turkish
community's ability to block action by the majority. 176 Some of the
proposed revisions were to "unamendable" articles that the Turks had
fought for in the original constitutional negotiations 177 Both the Turkish
government and Turkish Cypriot leadership condemned the proposed
178
revisions.
Civil disorder broke out in December 1963 when a seemingly
routine police questioning sparked an armed confrontation that
escalated into the siege by the Greek Cypriot forces of the Turkish
section of Nicosia. 179 Greek and Turkish troops stationed outside of
Nicosia joined the fighting, and the Turkish Cypriots appealed for
military help from Turkey. 180 In response, Turkish jets flew warning
flights over Greek Cypriot installations, and both sides, including

171.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 311 (explaining further that when Cyprus became a
member of the United Nations in 1960, the UN Charter's principle of majority-rule
provided Makarios a valuable argument in his campaign).
172.
Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1039 (noting that "[]tis tempting to say that the
scheme never had any chance of lasting success-that a constitution that requires the
ethnic origin of the coroner.., to be that of the deceased could only fail.").
173.
Id. (using as an example that the Turkish minority in the House of
Representatives was provided absolute veto over tax legislation).
174.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 312-17. UN mediators reported that the
constitution's grant of disproportionate power to the Turkish Cypriots gave rise to the
"most serious difficulties of implementation." Report by the United Nations Mediator on
Cyprus to the Secretary-General, UN SCOR, 20th Sess., Supp. 1, at 249, U.N. Doc. S6253
(1965).
175.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 146.
176.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 43.
177.
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 25.
178.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 43.
179.
Greek Cypriot policemen demanded identity cards from a Turkish Cypriot
couple walking late at night in the red-light district of Nicosia, the confrontation exploded
into shootings and deaths, and the virtual siege of Turkish parts of the capital city
followed. See PURCELL, supra note 45, at 323-24; see also NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at
32-33 (stating that heavy firing led to evacuation by the Turkish Cypriots and the area
was secured by the Greek Cypriot forces).
180.

JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 43-45.
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paramilitary groups, prepared for conflict.' 8' As fighting spread, each
side placed guards on rooftops, erected road blocks, and dug trenches
around their zones of control.1 8 2 General warfare soon erupted, with UN
observers reporting that hundreds of villages, most of them Turkish,
were destroyed or severely damaged, and that hundreds of people were
killed on both sides.' 8 3 The violence naturally prompted members of
both communities to seek safety in separate enclaves evolving in former
Greek and Turkish Cypriot neighborhoods, and thousands of people were
compelled to abandon their homes.' 8 4 Cruel atrocities were inflicted by
85
both sides.'
On Christmas Day 1963, alarmed over the scope of the fighting, the
three Guarantor Powers offered peacekeeping troops, which were
accepted by the Cyprus government and promptly put in place."8 6
Within days, a neutral zone, known as the "green line" was patrolled by
British forces.' 8 7 But the fighting continued into early 1964, when the
Turkish threat to intervene militarily to protect the Turkish Cypriots
was avoided only by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's injunction against
the use of U.S.-supplied weapons.' 8 8 A British proposal to install a UN
peacekeeping mission was approved by the United Nations Security
Council in March 1964.189

181.
Palmer, supra note 157, at 434. Preparations included staging ofTurkish land.
air, and naval forces near the island, and secrete preparations to move an entire Greek
division onto the island. JOSEPH, supranote 39, at 22-23.
182.
See Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Security
Council on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus, Doc. S15950 of 10 Sept. 1964.
183.
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 35-37 (citing UN reports). Anarchy ruled,
correspondents witnessed Greeks burning Turkish homes within view of the police, and
the terror spread to other villages beyond Nicosia. Id.
184.
BOROWIEC, supranote 49, at 57-58.
185.
PURCELL, supra note 45, at 326-28. ([P]ogroms ... disgusting acts of arson.
sadism, and vengeance..." help explain subsequent miseries on Cyprus). After December
1963 most Turkish Cypriots withdrew to a ghetto.like existence following a period of
intercommunal murder and arson. BOROWVIEC, supra note 49, at xiv.
186.
Ehrlich, supranote 39, at 1044. Under British leadership, Greek, Turkish, and
British troops already on the island were immediately deployed and all four governments
jointly requested a UN representative to observe the operation. Id. at 1044.45.
187.
FEN OSLEIHAAIPSON, NURTURING PEACE, WHY PEACE SEITrLEM'r SUCCEED
OR FAIL 233 (1996). To this day, called the Green Line after "[a] British officer hastily
marked the dividing line on a map with green ink." BOROVIEC, supra note 39, at 57.
188.
Richard Clogg, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post.1974 Period, in THE
GREEK-TUREISH CONFLICT IN THE 1990'S 13 (Dimitri Constas ed., 1991). The United
States was inextricably involved in the matter because it had supplied and trained both
Greek and Turkish forces-billions of dollars of military aid-and was the foremost leader
of NATO. Johnson used "all the juridical thunderbolts that could be assembled" to
restrain the Turks. THOMAS EHRLICH, CYPRUS 1958-1967 83 (1974).
189.
Security Council Resolution on the Creation of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICP) Resolution no. 186 was adopted on March 4,
1964, calling for restraint from all parties, authorizing the creation of the peace-keeping
force, and recommended that the Secretary General appoint a mediator to lead
negotiations toward a peaceful settlement. Id. at 1-4, 7. "Only four years after they had
painfully achieved independence, the Cypriots became victims of a superpower design for
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90
The dispute was too deep, however, for these peacekeeping efforts
to resolve, and continuing conflict prompted further negotiations among
all the major powers, the United Nations, and NATO throughout the
next three years. 19 1 In 1967, "Greece precipitated a second crisis by
stationing 10,000 Greek troops on the island, far exceeding the number
allowed" by treaty, but international pressure again produced a
settlement, reducing partisan troop levels and increasing peacekeeper
forces, as the conflict continued to simmer. 192 In 1974, a third and more
serious brisis erupted "when the military government of Greece
engineered a coup in Cyprus that temporarily replaced President
Makarios with a staunchly pro-enosis leader."'193
This extraconstitutional change of government alarmed many, and leading powers
renewed negotiations, searching for a solution. 194 The Turkish Prime
Minister flew to London to solicit help in a joint effort to uphold the
Treaty of Guaranty, but Britain declined. 195 Fearful that the major
powers would accept the new Cypriot regime, 19 6 Turkey invaded the

partition. This partition reflected only the strategic requirement of outside powers, and
did not conform to any local needs. The economy of Cyprus, with its distribution of water
resources and agriculture, makes partition an absurdity." HITCHENS, supra note 46, at 11.
190.
Seven thousand peacekeepers established calm on the island, though only in
degree. Bad acts escalated into atrocities: twenty thousand Turkish Cypriots were
allegedly forced out of their homes to the Turkish side; the Cypriot government then
imposed an economic blockade on the refugees' camps; neither side allowed free movement
of people between the two sides; and the constitutional balance disintegrated, as most
Turkish Cypriot officials left or were forced from the government; culminating in Greek
Cypriot attacks on several Turkish Cypriot villages, followed by Turkish air force bombing
of the attackers. Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 1051-54.
191.
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 49-51. At one point the U.S. Sixth Fleet was
positioned between the island and Turkey's mainland to calm the tension, and
subsequently the Acheson Plan-after then U.S. Secretary of State Dean Achesonrecommended a compromise enosis with Greece, with concessions to the Turks, but neither
side would agree to the concessions included. Id.
192.
Palmer, supra note 157, at 436-37.
193.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 147. Greek officers commanding Greek Cypriot
national guardsmen staged a coup, replacing Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III
with enosist Nikos Sampson. Schmidt, supra note 138, at 23. The last six years before
1974 were marked by intermittent negotiations, as two parallel political regimes in a
patchwork system of co-existence, until "the impulsive successor to Papdopoulos, Brigidier
General Dimitrios Ionnides, ordered the Cypriot National Guard . . . to overthrow
Makarious and take control of the government of Cyprus." PARKER T. HART, Two NATO
ALLIES AT THE THRESHOLD OF WAR: CYPRUS, A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT, 1965-1968 129-30 (1990).
194.
Palmer, supra note 157, at 423. See Henry Kissinger's interesting description
of the unfolding events around the distraction in the Watergate presidency and an
unneeded crisis involving two NATO allies becoming "entangled in our domestic politics."
HENRY KISSINGER, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL 1187-93 (1982). See also BRENDAN O'MALLEY &
IAN CRAIG, THE CYPRUS CONSPIRACY 223 (1999) (American and British governments
considered Cyprus' military facilities of paramount importance and more easily protected
"in a divided Cyprus.").
195.
Marios L. Hart, The Legal Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J.
227, 261-62 (1975) (stating that Turkey charged Greece with violating the Treaty).
196.
Palmer, supranote 157, at 438.
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island, and the situation degenerated: "150,000 Greeks fled from their
19 7
homes and land in the north, while 46,000 Turks fled from the south."
The UN buffer zone became a virtual Berlin wall, with a complete
separation of the populations. 198 World leaders scrambled to "prevent
the crisis from escalating into an explosive regional conflict."199 The
U.S., in the lead at this point, expressed regret over the invasion, but
publicly blamed Greece for the coup, as U.S. and British diplomats
worked not to reverse the invasion, but to restrain the Greeks from going
to war with Turkey.20 0 The goal was foremost to stabilize the NATO
20
alliance. '
The division of the population into two homogeneous ethnic zones
was completed in 1975 when the factions formally agreed upon a largescale population exchange between the north and south zones under the
auspices of the United Nations. 20 2 Since then, some eighty thousand
Turkish settlers, and thirty thousand Turkish troops have increased the
local population to over 200,000.203 The Green Line manned by the
United Nations maintains the buffer zone between the two communities
20
in Nicosia to this day.

4

Politically, the northern Turkish community adopted a constitution
by referendum in 1974, and its leader, Rauf Denktas, proclaimed the
northern part of the island the Turkish Federated State on Cyprus in
1975.205 The formal declaration of its independence from the Republic of
Cyprus followed in November 1983, with the unilateral establishment of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 20 r The United
Nations Security Council condemned the declaration as an illegal
partition of Cyprus. 20 7 Despite disapproval of the international
community, the northern sector to this day possesses a fully functioning
and democratically elected national government consisting of a
presidency, a legislature of fifty MPs, similarly elected municipal

197.

MICHAEL EMERSON, REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 72 (1998).

198.

Id.

199.

O'MALLEY & CRAIG, supra note 194, at 187.

200. Id. at 188-91. For details of the invasion and subsequent diplomacy leachng to
the stalemate, see id. at 187-98.
201. See Crisis on Cyprus, A Report Preparedby the Subcommittee to Investigate
ProblemsConnectedwith Refugees and Escapeesfor the Judiciaryof the U.S. Senate. 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974).
202. Wippman, supranote 51, at 171; U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess. Supp. For July-Sept.
1975, at 39-40, U.N. Doc. Sf11789.
203. Not a Baby, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2000, at 14.15. The Turkish military has an
important influence on the island. 2000 COMMISsION REGULAR REP. ON CYPRUS at 18.
204. Letter From Nicosia,ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 99.
205. Palmer, supra note 157, at 441 (stating that this was "an internal
reorganization of the autonomous Turkish administration... not intended to be an
independent). Id. at 441 n.143.
206.

REGULAR REPORT ON CYPRUS, supra note 203, at 10.

207.

U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2499th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. SIP.V. 2499 (1983).
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governments, and a functioning judiciary.2 0 8 Thus, the two communities
established and to this day maintain parallel political systems, based on
parties, administrative
the European model and with the usual range 2of
09
government agencies, and education systems.
III. THE IMPASSE

Events after 1974 produced alternating hope and frustration, as the
two sides struggled unsuccessfully through years of negotiation and
mediation efforts, ultimately evincing an unyielding impasse. Only the
between Greece and Turkey
present warming climate of rapprochement
2 10
suggests a breakthrough of that impasse.
In 1975, a unanimous UN resolution expressed grave concern over
the Turkish invasion.2 11 Resolution 3212 "call[ed] upon all states to
respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non"and encouraged "the speedy
alignment of the Republic of Cyprus ....
withdrawal of all foreign armed forces" from the Republic and the
"cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs."2 12 Further, the
resolution called for cooperation with the UN peace-keeping force and
requested the Secretary-General to "continue to lend his good offices" in
would itself
promoting a settlement of the dispute. 213 This21resolution
4
create new issues and strengthen old divisions.
UN sponsored negotiations started in 1975 in Vienna.2 15 Greek
that would preserve
Cypriots proposed "a bi-communal federal state ...
the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Cyprus"2 16 The Turkish Cypriots argued for a looser federal solution
based on a partnership of two equal polities, acting under one central,
weak, and equal administration, "working together at first in a
comparatively limited field, but at the same time co-operating in many

208.
Id.
209.
See CYPRUS, A COUNTRY STUDY, at 43-45 (1993).
210.
See infra Part IV.
211.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 112. Adopted by 117 votes to none, the resolution
was the Greek Cypriot's most impressive victory in their frequent resort to the UN forum.
Id. at 111-12.
UN Resolution no. 3212 (XXIX) General Assembly Resolution on the
212.
1, 2.
Withdrawal of Foreign Armed Forces from Cyprus,
213.
UN Resolution no. 3212 (XXIX) General Assembly Resolution on the
Withdrawal of Foreign Armed Forces from Cyprus, para. 8,9.
214.
See infra text accompanying notes 237-59.
215.
CLEMENT H. DODD,THE CYPRUS IMBROGLIO 34 (1998).
And would "ensure that the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be the sole
216.
subject of international law to the exclusion of the constituent parts, and preserve the
unity of the country" with a strong central and unitary government, which was the Greek
Cypriot government in existence at that time. NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 157.

20011

CYPRUS IN EUROPE

spheres of administration." 217 Both parties further disagreed on the
the two
practical details of any settlement, such as borders between
218
communities and compensation for displaced persons.
The parties made "substantial progress in narrowing their
differences" in the late 1970s. 219 In 1977, both communities agreed on
four guidelines for future talks, most notably agreeing on the
bicommunal federal republic form, which was a departure from the 1960
constitution, and thus a concession by the Greek Cypriots. 22 0 A ten point
agreement in 1979 confirmed these basic guidelines and added topics
such as respect for human rights and other aspects of a comprehensive
settlement.2 2 1 These high-level agreements in 1977 and 1979
represented a turning point because it was the first time the two sides
agreed to seek a settlement on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal
222

federal republic.
Greek Cypriot proposals in the early 1980s again emphasized the
sovereignty and indivisibility of the island, as well as the concept of
single citizenship and a strong central government, but the Turkish
Cypriots accused them of simply trying to create a unitary state.2 2 The
Greeks persistently internationalized the dispute, resulting in the 1983
UN General Assembly resolution proclaiming the Greek Cypriot
Republic's sovereignty over the entire island. 224 In response, the
Turkish Cypriot Parliament declared its independence and sovereignty,
based on the right of self-determination.2 2 5 The United Nations declared
this attempted secession illegal and endorsed the Greek Cypriot
2 26
embargo of the north.

217. The joint administration's enumerated powers would be advisory at first,
leaving the residue of power with the two states, but could develop as confidence between
the communities grew. Id. at 156-57.
218. Wippman, supra note 51, at 173.
219. Id. Turkish seismic explorations in Aegean areas claimed by Greece inflamed
relations briefly in 1976, but diplomacy achieved relative stability until the end of the
decade. Clogg, supranote 188, at 16.
220. A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 209, at 45.
221. DODD, supra note 134, at 35-36. For text of the Ten Points, see NECATIGIL.
supra note 106, at 162-63.
JOSEPH, supranote 39, at 135 (citing Makarios.Denktas agreement. UN doe.
222.
S/12323, T 5,30 Apr. 1977 and Kyprianou-Denktash agreement, UN doe. Sf13369.31 May
1979).
223. DODD, supra note 134, at 37.
224. Question of Cyprus, U.N. GAOR, 37th Seas., 121st plen. mtg. at 49,U.N. Dec.
A1371253 (1983). See NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 191-92. The Greek Cypriots
successfully turned the UN into a powerful and effective political weapon against the
Turks gaining a dominant supremacy in the international political and diplomatic scene.
JOSEPH, supranote 39, at 15.
225. NECAGITIL, supra note 106, at 196. The motion declared the right of the
Turkish Cypriots to self-determination, with equal rights and status in an independent
Cyprus, but no effective date was set for implementing the self-determination resolution.
Id. Turkey immediately recognized the new state. Clogg, supra note 188, at 18-22.
226. DODD, supra note 215, at 38; Security Council Resolution 541 (18 Nov. 1983),
37th Sess., 2500th mtg., S/Res]541 (1983).
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After this, the Greek Cypriots refused to meet face to face with the
Turkish Cypriots, so "proximity talks" were instituted by the UN
Secretary-General de Cuellar.22 7 In 1985, two significant developments
in the negotiations occurred: First, TRNC president Denktas agreed to
lessen the Turkish claim to thirty-seven percent of the island under
TRNC authority, and he abandoned the insistence that the office of
president be rotated between Turk and Greek Cypriots; second, a draft
agreement was formulated for the reunification of the island as a federal
republic with two autonomous states, but the Greek Cypriot president
Kyprianou refused to sign it, concerned over the balance of voting powers
given the Turkish side and other problems involving the complexity of
228
any settlement.
In 1987, hopes for progress waned and then rose, as Greece and
Turkey narrowly averted war over contested drilling and exploration in
the Aegean, followed by a successful summit meeting at Davos,
Switzerland that yielded an agreement for closer cooperation. 229 The
warmer "spirit of Davos" culminated in the 1989 agreement authorizing
the United Nations to draw up a negotiating draft for settlement, though
subsequent demands for stronger language about the TRNC's
230
sovereignty by Denktas chilled the process.
During this time, cooperation between the Republic of Cyprus and
the European Union evolved. In 1987, an agreement was signed,
proposing the gradual implementation of a customs union, and, in 1990,
the Cypriot government applied for full EC membership. 23 1 The
application proposed membership for the entire island, but the Turkish
Cypriot leadership rejected that government's right to speak for the
whole island. 232 The EC rejected the TRNC position, repeating its
support of the UN recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and non-

227.
DODD, supra note 215, at 38-39.
228.
Palmer, supra note 157, at 450 (stating that President Kyprianou disagreed
with provisions for weighted voting and veto power for the Turkish Vice President. He was
also concerned about the lack of a timetable for withdrawal of Turkish troops, and
international guarantee of the agreement and the problem of 180,000 Greek Cypriot
refugees wishing to return to the portion of the island controlled by the Turkish Cypriots).
"A possible settlement was missed in 1985 when Kyprianou refused to sign a recently
worked out accord, fearing it conceded too much to the other side." A COUNTRY STUDY,
supra note 209, at 45.
229.
Clogg, supra note 188, at 20 (stating that the Davos agreement called for
intensification of contacts, cooperation in cultural exchanges and tourism, and creation of
two committees to promote political and economic relations).
230.
DODD, supra note 134, at 42-43.
231.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 117. An association agreement had been signed in
1972, but implementation was delayed due to the 1974 invasion and its consequences on
the economy. Id. The customs agreement has progressed and, by the present time, most
trade barriers have been removed. DODD, supra note 215, at 60.
232.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 117. An association agreement had been signed in
1972, but implementation was delayed due to the 1974 invasion and its consequences on
the economy. Id. The customs agreement has progressed and, by the present time, most
trade barriers have been removed. DODD, supra note 215, at 60.
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recognition of the TRNC, and the application was accepted for
2 33
consideration.
In the 1990s, the negotiations climate deteriorated as "the Turkish
authorities inaugurated a war of nerves in the Aegean," while Greece
embarked on a seventeen billion dollar military modernization effort and
then issued the ultimatum in the European Union that Cyprus must be
considered as an early EU candidate or Greece would veto the accession
of the newly emerging democracies in Central Europe.23 4 In 1991, after
the Gulf War, initiatives by the United Nations and the United States
prompted the resumption of talks. 23 5 Intense shuttle diplomacy ensued
among Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, as several rounds of intercommunal
talks were conducted. 236 Then, in 1992, the parties agreed upon the
Secretary-General's "Set of ideas on an overall framework agreement on
Cyprus" to form the basis for further negotiations. 237 Under this
proposal, Cyprus would remain one country, a bi-zonal federal republic
"with a single sovereignty and international personality,"238 which would
be divided into two politically equal communities with each exercising
state-like authority over most matters, such as education, economic
development, social welfare, "security, law and order, and the
administration of justice."23 9 The common federal government would
exercise authority in limited competences, such as in foreign affairs,
central bank functions, customs, federal budget, and taxation,2 40 and
each community would enjoy equal and effective participation in this
joint government, as well as a veto power over designated measures
against that community's interest.2 41 The "set of ideas" also called for
the demilitarization of the island, the maintenance of the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee, the adjustment of the territories of the two states, and the
2 42
recognition of the rights of persons displaced by the conflict.

JOSEPH, supranote 39, at 118. The EU considers the Republic of Cyprus to be
233.
the "sole interlocutor" for accession discussions. Id. at 120. The application was referred
to the Commission for study. DODD, supra note 215, at 62.
HITCHENS, supra note 46, at xiii.
234.
235.
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 370.
236. Id.
237. Wippman, supra note 51, at 174. Set of Ideas, annexed to United Nations,
Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in
Cyprus, U.N. Doc. S/24472 (1992) [hereinafter Set of Ideas]. "A sensible, broadly federal
Set of Ideas put forward by the U.N. in 1992 has become more or less accepted, at least as

an outline for a settlement." Cyprus Seeks Leader, ECoNOMIST, Feb. 7, 1998, at 20.

238.
239.
240.

Set of Ideas, supranote 237.
Id. 9 18, 22, 48-51.
Id. 9125.
Id. 9 5 (pronouncing the "political equality of the two communities"). See also

241.
id. 9132 (explaining that the proposal permitted a simple majority of representatives for

either side to block legislation on key matters, such as foreign affairs, budget, security,
taxation, and others).
242. Id. 99 53, 54, 69, and 74.
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Further negotiations led the Secretary-General to report that the
parties were "within agreement range" on the key areas of territory and
displaced persons in the "set of ideas" and that overall agreement was
likely.243 The Security Council then endorsed the Secretary's report and
the "set of ideas. '244 Agreement did not follow, however, and the
Secretary-General reported that an overall framework agreement was
not achieved. 24 5 Eight confidence-building measures proposed by the
Secretary-General and endorsed by the Security Council 2 46 "seemed to
offer greater possibility of bringing the two sides together. '247 The 1993
Greek-Cypriot election, however, brought in new leadership under
Glafkos Clerides, who had campaigned by denouncing the Set of Ideas as
blocking Cyprus' path into the EC. 248 With U.S. and UN pressure
building, negotiations focused especially on the confidence-building
measures of re-opening the airport at Nicosia and the return of Varosha
on the island's eastern coast. 249 Both sides agreed on the measures in
principle in early 1994, and proximity discussions followed. 250 The
negotiations were hindered by the Greek Cypriots' concern that they
2 51
might in some way imply recognition of the TRNC.
Numerous meetings, including concessions on all sides, led to a
June 1994 Secretary-General report of "sufficient progress" to implement
a modified package of the measures. 2 52 Ultimately, however, the "logical
connection between political equality and recognition had become all too
apparent... " and the Greek Cypriot leaders would not go forward with
the measures. 25 3 Two EU events in 1994 also contributed to the

243.
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 394-95.
244.
S.C. Res. 774, U.N. SCOR, 47thSess., 309th mtg., at 94, U.N. Doc. S/Res/774
(1992).
245.
See NECATIGIL, supranote 106, at 397. The Secretary-General explained that
a "deep crisis of confidence" separated the two sides, observing that both sides posed
conditions that could stall agreement. Id.
246.
See id. at 397-98. The proposals included reducing the number of Turkish
troops on the island, extending the UN buffer zone to include Varosha, the modern part of
Famagusto, to which access was controlled by Turkish troops, and promoting people-topeople contact, among others. See id.
247.
DODD, supra note 215, at 51.
248.
Id.
249.
See id. at 54-55; see also id. at 56 (explaining Varosha is an abandoned, fenced
tourist resort owned mostly by Greek Cypriots, but closed offby the Turkish Cypriots. The
area was surrounded on three sides by the TRNC with the sea at the fourth side. The UN
proposed to open it again, allow owners to reclaim their property, and encourage
businesses to reinvigorate it as a tourist and free trade zone.).
250.
Id. at 55.
251.
See id. at 55 (explaining that they "would only discuss the Confidence-building
measures if they implied no direct, or indirect, recognition of the [TRNC]."). Id. at 55. See
also id. at 58 (explaining that this was especially problematic in the negotiations over reopening the airport, because, inter alia, permitting Cyprus Turkish Airlines to operate out
of Nicosia might imply some degree of recognition).
252.
Id. at 59.
253.
Id. at 59-60. See also id. (explaining that the Greek Cypriot National Council
voted unanimously not to continue the negotiations on the measures).
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deterioration: EU leaders at the Corfu Summit in June agreed to place
the Republic of Cyprus next in line for EU accession negotiations, and
the EU's European Court of Justice ruled that health certificates for
imports into the European Union must be issued by "legitimate
authorities," thus banning certificates from the TRNC. 254 Thus, the

European Union sought to minimize the TRNC's political and economic
status. Greek Cypriot attitudes hardened after the European Union
accepted their application for accession of the island, and this hardening
was evidenced in their lack of interest in the 1994 confidence-building
255
measures.
At the same time, the European Commission took the view early on
that Cyprus' integration into the Community "implies a peaceful,
balanced and lasting settlement . . . " of the conflict dividing the

island. 256 The European Union later yielded to Greek pressure,
abandoning the requirement that settlement be achieved prior to
accession in exchange for Greek agreement to the Amsterdam Treaty
and eastern enlargement. 25 7 In what is termed the "historical
compromise" of March 6, 1995, Greece withheld its veto of the EUTurkey customs union, and in return, the EU leaders agreed that
negotiations for Cyprus' accession would begin six months after the
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference begun in Turin in
March 1996.258 The breakthrough for the customs union between the
European Union and Turkey represented a "landmark deal," sending a
billion ecus in aid to Turkey, as well as opening access to the EU
259
markets.

254.
Cyprus,As Divided as Ever, EcONOMIsT, Aug. 6, 1994, at 43. (explaining that
until Corfu, internati( nal orthodoxy required settlement of the Lsland's division prior to
accession. As a result of these two setbacks, Denktas refused to cooperate and "the Greek
Cypriots are cock-a-hoop at his discomfiture." The EU action "seems destined to make
matters worse.").
255.
DODD, supra note 215, at 92.
256.
Heinz-Jfirgen Axt, The Island of Cyprus and the Europcan Union, in CYPRUS:
THE NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVWEs 174, 176-77 (Clement H. Dodd ed., 1999).

257. Id. at 177. One commentator offered harsh criticisms of Greece's bargaining,
arguing that the EU should have made resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute on Cyprus
a condition to Greece's original accession in 1981. Reginald Dale, Lapse by EU Creates a
Trojan Horse, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1997, at 13 (explaining that "[mlost EU
governments have long since regretted admitting Greece in 1981 - and not just because of
Cyprus. Under its late leader, Andreas Papandreou, Athens milked the coffers of the
Union and contributed virtually nothing but a sullen attitude.).
258. Axt, supranote 256, at 178. This decision was confirmed at the European
Council in Cannes in June 1995. For explanation of the Greek veto and the underlying
objections, see Europem Union Veto Mania, EcONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 48.
259.
EU ForgesLundmark Dealfor Customs Lbd to Turkey, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Mar. 4, 1995. The article explains that "[tihe agreement has been a major goal of the
European Union, which increasingly regards poverty and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in the Middle East and North Africa as the biggest threat to European
security." Id.
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Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. diplomat who negotiated the Bosnia
peace agreement in 1995, announced soon thereafter that he hoped to
"make 1996 the year of the big push on Cyprus." 2 60 U.S. President Bill
Clinton targeted improvement in the Cyprus conflict as a key to defusing
tensions between Turkey and Greece that threaten the integrity of
NATO and the stability of all of southern Europe and the eastern
Mediterranean. 26 1 Soon, however, a dispute over a tiny islet inhabited
2 2
only by goats pressed Turkey and Greece to the verge of war.

Holbrooke confirmed that the crisis had taken the two NATO allies to
the brink, before mediation resolved the dispute. 263 EU representatives
traveled to northern Cyprus to encourage cooperation between the two
sides of the island, but cooperation in confidence-building measures
264
between the two communities failed.
In the second half of 1996, tensions rose again, with deadly violence
on the cease-fire line, as two Greece Cypriots were killed in two separate
incidents in August. 265 The UN reports condemned the "deteriorating

situation" in Cyprus, noting the violence along the cease fire line had
reached a level not seen since 1974.266
In 1997, the talks continued in various locations, and the Security
Council reiterated its plea for all sides to continue with the negotiations,
to reduce the high levels of military spending and number of foreign
troops on the island, and to implement reciprocal measures for reducing
tension along the cease-fire lines. 26 7 Under Holbrooke's leadership,
Clerides and Denktas met in New York in July and agreed to continue

260.

Michael Dobbs, Holbrooke Shifts Targets: Now He'll Tackle Cyprus, INT'L

HERALD TRUB., Dec. 20, 1995.

261.

Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Seeks End to Cyprus Stalemate, INT'L HERALD

TRIB., June 19, 1996.

262.
John K. Cooley, U.S. Discovers the Hazardous Politics of the Aegean, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 1996. See also Sad Cyprus, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 1996, at 12
(explaining that the two sides "nearly went to war over a few rocks in the Aegean little
bigger than the limpets that live on them.").
263.
Greek-Trkish Crisis Over a Tiny Island Forces U.S. to Alter Mission, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 1, 1996.
Axt, supra note 256, at 178.
264.
265.
CyprusImpasse, INT'L HEARLD TRIB., Aug. 29, 1996.
266.
Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Extends
Mandate of UNFICYP Until 30 June 1997, U.N. Doc. SC/6307 (Dec. 23, 1996). The press
release reiterates the UN's grave concern about excessive levels of expansion and
modernization of the military forces in Cyprus as well as violent incidents causing Greek
and Turkish Cypriot deaths and injuries. Id.
Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Extends
267.
Cyprus Mission Until 30 June 1998, U.N. Doc. SC/6460 (Dec. 23, 1997). The press release
states that "[t]he Council reaffirmed its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based
on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising
two politically equal communities as described in relevant Security Council resolutions, in
a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation." Id.
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talking in August in Geneva. 268 At the New York meeting, a creative
concept emerged. Ajoint statement drafted for the conference proposed
a settlement based on a State of Cyprus with single sovereignty and
international personality-notably not titled the Republic of Cyprusand providing that the State's one, indivisible sovereignty "emanates
69
equally from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities."
The Greek Cypriots fiercely opposed it, and after the European Union
announced that Greek Cyprus' accession would go forward regardless of
the outcome of the talks, the negotiations degenerated. 270 Ultimately,
Denktas walked out of the negotiations in Switzerland, insisting that the
71
TRNC be treated on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriots.
When the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit included Cyprus in
the first group of accession applicants to open enlargement negotiations,
to the exclusion of Turkey, all dialogue with the European Union halted
abruptly. 272 Turkish-TRNC leaders issued their joint declaration
proposing northern Cyprus' gradual integration into Turkey, rather than
into the European Union. 2 73 The joint statement denounced the ongoing Cyprus-EU accession negotiations as an "historic mistake" that
"will speed up the integration process between the TRNC and
Turkey."2 74 Subsequently that year, the two countries signed an
Association Agreement to encourage further integration in economic,
defense, and foreign policy. 275 The European Union has declared that

268.

Philip Gordon, Cyprus: Divorce Could PrecedeReconciliation, IWT'L HERLD

TRIB., July 24, 1997, at 8. See also Celestine Bohlen, In 'SignalofHope,'Greelsand Turks
Take Wary Step to Better Ties, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 22, 1997, at 5 (explaining that

calmer voices were being heard in both Turkey and Greece, as the combative Andreas
Papandreou was succeeded by the low-key Costas Simitis and the pro-Islamic Necmetun

Erbakan was succeeded by the center-right, pro-European Mesut Yilmaz).
269.

Draft Joint Statement by the Leader of the Greek Cypriot Community and the

Leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community (Troutbeck. 12 July 1997) & 2c.
270.
271.

DODD, supra note 215, at 102.
See Keep on Trying, ECONOMIST, July 24. 1999 (explaining that the idea is not

that far from the loose federation that Clerides would accept but the Greek Cypriots are
reluctant to give the TRNO any form of recognition).
272.
Hans van den Broek, Europe'sExpander, ECONO.UST, June 6, 1998, at 54. See
Philip H.Gordon, Turkey Overreacts, but the EU Is Not Blameless, I'rL HERALD TRIB..

Dec. 20, 1997, at 6 (explaining that the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmatz stormed
out of the summit, as Turkey threatened to renounce the Customs Union. annex the
TRNC, and "veto NATO enlargement."); see also Barry James, Turkey Is Rejected for EU

Membership;Amid Signs of Showdown on Cyprus,Ankhara Ends PoliticalDialogue,INr'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 15, 1997, at 1 (explaining that in the TRNC, Denktas complained that
the EU decision had "helped destroy the established framework for a settlement in
Cyprus.").
273.
RegularReport From the Commissionon Turkey's ProgressToward Accession,
in A. Introduction b) Relations between the European Union and Turkey, Historical
Background and Recent Development 5 (hereinafter RegularReport on Turkey's Progress).
274.
Id. § 1.3.
275.
Id.
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international law as
the proposed integration is "incompatible 7with
2 6
expressed in the relevant UN resolutions.
Further complicating the conflict, the TRNC has refused to
participate in the accession negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus
and the European Union.2 7 7 Although Mr. Denktas does not oppose
accession involving the Greek Cypriots, since December 1997 he has
refused to meet with EU representatives, considering accession to
involve Greek Cypriots only.2 78 The European Commission faults the
Turkish Cypriots' intransigence for the continuing delay in Cyprus'
accession negotiations, though such a divided polity hardly represents a
27 9
fertile ground for collaboration.
Throughout 1998, Holbrooke "tried and failed to revive talks
between the two parts of the fractured island. '28 0 When the talks broke
down, he complained that he had been unable to make progress in three
days of mediation, observing that Turkish Cypriot demands made
"meaningful exchange" impossible. 28 '
The Turkish Cypriots had
demanded that their country be recognized as an independent state and
28 2
that EU membership talks with Greek-controlled Cyprus be canceled.
A month later, conflict threatened again as both Greek and Turkish
fighter jets were dispatched to the island.2 83 Thus, new disputes fanned
the flames of the typical antagonisms, sufficient to scuttle Holbrooke's
2 84
efforts at shuttle diplomacy.
Later in 1998, Turkey became alarmed about Russian missiles en
route to Greek Cyprus.28 5 Turkey threatened to bomb any installation of
the missiles, and the Greek Cypriots avoided the conflict by canceling
the installation.2 86 Clerides, under intense international pressure,

276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Regular Report on Cyprus, § 1.3. The Regular Report on Cyprus noted that
"because of the political situation ... the 'acquis' (screening) could not cover Cyprus as a
whole and... [i]t regretted that it had not been possible to achieve a political solution to
the continuing division of Cyprus in time for the accession negotiations." Id. (quoting the
General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on October 5.)
280.
Cyprus. Too Late, Perhaps, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999, at 46.
281.
U.S. Envoy Drops Talks On Reunifying Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1998, at
A16.
282.
Id.
283.
PoliticsThis Week, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 4. Greece Sends Warplanes
to New Base on Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at All (reporting that six Greek F-16
fighter jets and a C-130 transport arrived on June 15, 1998, at the newly constructed air
base in Western Paphos).
284.
See DODD, supra note 215, at 111 (providing an in-depth description of events
and negotiations).
285.
Stephen Kinzer, Greek and Turkish Jets Lead New Round of Cyprus Tension,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, at A5.
286.
Stephen Kinzer, Politically Weak at Home, Turks Flex Muscles Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, at 9. The United States and other European countries pressured
Cyprus as well. Id.
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defused the crisis by deciding not to install the Russian missiles, but
hopes for progress were quashed by Denktas' insistence that his
government be recognized as a sovereign state before negotiations
begin. 287 While the two positions were not that far apart on paper, both
288
parties were psychologically miles apart.
The European Commissioner for External Relations, Hans van den
Broek, praised the Cypriot decision not to install the missile system and
then chided Turkey to contribute to the resolution of the conflict. 28 9 Van
den Broek then "expressed satisfaction" on progress of the Cyprus
accession negotiations and "reiterated the offer to the Turkish Cypriot
community . . . to join the Cypriot delegation negotiating EU
290

accession."
In that same year, Denktas suggested a confederation of the island's
two parts that would end the partition, but both Greek Cyprus and
Greece rejected it.291 The UN efforts at negotiating a resolution to the
impasse involved further shuttle diplomacy between the two sides,
generally promoting the 1992 UN "set of ideas" with its uframework for a
bizonal, bicommunal federation .... ,,292

In 1999, the Greek Cypriot government proposed demilitarizing the
island with the deployment of an international peace force on the
island.293 Turkish Cypriots condemned the suggestion as "political
hypocrisy" because it was the Greek Cypriots who were militarizing the
island.2 94 Subsequently, Greek officials offered to lift objections to
Turkey's EU membership if the European Union would permit Cyprus'
accession without first requiring a settlement of the divided island, 295
and days later Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit proclaimed 96at a rally in
2
northern Cyprus that the island could never be reunited.
At the Security Council's initiation in December, proximity talks
were convened in New York. 297 The Helsinki European Summit
expressed strong support for the effort and then issued the significant
decisions breaking the dead-lock on Turkey's accession negotiations and

287.

Cyprus. Too Late, Perhaps,supranote 280, at 46.

288.
289.

Cyprus. Can the Circle be Squared?, EcoNOMisT. Feb. 21. 1998. at 82.
EUlCyprus: Union Seeks Gesture From Turkey, Europe Information Service,

European Report, Feb. 3, 1999, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library; Europe; EURRPT File.
290.
Id.
291.
PoliticsThis Week, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 4.
292.
1999.

UNEnvoy to CyprusResumes Shuttle Talks, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 4.

293.

Turkish Cypriots Reject Proposal for International Peace Force, AGENCE

FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 5, 1999.

294. Id.
295.
Greece Offers Deal ForTurkey in EU, INT'L HERALD TRB.. July 13, 1999. at 7.
296.
Ecevit Bars a United Cyprus, INVL HERALD TRiB., July 21, 1999, at 6.
(explaining that a loose confederation might be possible, however).
297.

at 20.

2000 COMMgssION ON TURKEY's PROGRESS TO\\ARDS ACCESSION REGUIAR REP.,
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freeing Cyprus for advancement as well. 298 Further rounds of talks

continued throughout 2000, with "encouraging signs that the two sides
were engaging in substantive discussion. 2 99

IV. CURRENT CLIMATE OF RAPPROCHEMENT

Unexpected events in 1999 and 2000 contributed to a stunning shift
in relations between Greece and Turkey, 300 presenting what one
commentator described as "an unprecedented combination of favourable
circumstance to resolve the [Cyprus) dispute" and "a historic window of
opportunity for reconciliation.13 0'
Typically tense Greek-Turkish
relations flared in February 1999, over Greece's harboring of a notorious
Kurdish terrorist, 30 2 but by year's end Greece had dropped its veto of

298.
See supratext accompanying note 28.
299.
REGULAR REP. ON CYPRUS, supra note 203, at 21-22. See also, A New Route?,
ECONOMIST, July 15, 2000 (The proximity talks produced a "limp agreement to meet again"
but the leaders agreed to consider "thoughts" about how a settlement can be reached,"
covering the same issues the two sides have disagreed over for decades: how to make the
Turkish Cypriots feel secure, how much land to restore to the Greek Cypriots, and how to
fashion a weak central government after partition ends). The Secretary-General's Report
to the Security Council in December 2000 noted the several meetings of Clerides and
Denktas and others, and observed a generally stable situation along the cease-fire line.
Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nationsoperation in Cyprus,
2, 16, U.N.
Doc S/2000/1138 (Dec. 1, 2000).
300.
Kerin Hope, DramaticShift in Relations Between Old Enemies, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1999, at 1. ("It would be hard to imagine a more dramatic shift taking place in
relations between the old enemies Greece and Turkey."). While Greece has been a
prospering member of the European Union for years, Turkey's aspiration to join the
European Union combines with its strategic position in the region to warrant careful
attention to its current evolution. "The critical geopolitical position of Turkey between
Europe and the Middle East, between the West and the growing natural resource
economies of Central Asia, is by now a cottage industry unto itself in post-Cold War
scholarship." Barry Bartmann, The Quest for Legitimacy: InternationalStatus of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in CYPRUS, A NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVES 260,279
(Clement H. Dodd ed., 1999). See also A Turkish Move into CentralAsia, ECONOMIST, Nov.
25, 2000, at 56 (Recent Turkish dealings with Uzebek leaders, for military arms and
training, could shift the balance of power in this vast area. The United States, hoping to
stem Iranian and Russian influence in the region, is delighted at Turkey's advances, but
the instability and potential for conflict must cause worry to observers.); Iraq Resumes
Oil-Flow to Turkey, but Not Exports: Officials, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 5, 2000 (oil
flows from Iraq through pipelines to Turkish ports).
301.
Leyla Boulton & Kerin Hope, Omens Good for Greek-Turkish Links, FIN.
TIMES, June 6, 2000, at 3. Commentators termed recent military cooperation between the
two former enemies as "dramatic evidence of the recent rapprochementbetween the two
neighbouring countries." Id. (emphasis added).
302.
The discovery that Greek diplomats sheltered Turkey's most notorious fugitive,
Kurdish terrorist Abdullah Ocalan, caused a stir in Turkey. Stephen Kinzer, In Snatching
a Fugitive Rebel, Ankara Wins Opportunitieson Several Fronts,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999,
at A6. See also Stephen Kinzer, Turkey and Greece Trade Words Over Kurd, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1999, at A12. (Turkish president calls Greece an "outlaw state" which "should be
added to the list of countries which support terrorism and harbor terrorists."). Id.
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Turkish candidacy to the European Union, a watershed event in itself,
and the two traditional rival countries were exchanging confidencebuilding promises of cooperation. 30 3 Five accords, on matters from
culture to maritime safety, were signed as collaboration between the
traditional rivals. 30 4 In early 2000, the countries' foreign ministers
made official visits to each other's capitals, the first of a Turkish Foreign
Minister to Athens in forty years. 305 Then, in an event with powerful
symbolism, Turkish fighter jets landed in Greece for NATO exercises in
May 2000, the first time Turkish aircraft have ever been in Greece. 30 6 In
June, Turkish marines landed on a Greek beach as part of NATO
exercises. 30 7 In September 2000, cooperation continued as the Turkish
military Chief of Staff attended NATO talks in Athens, while a
prominent Greek banker was in Istanbul finalizing a huge private equity
308
fund for investment in Turkish companies.
This unexpected diplomatic reversal was caused by an intersection
of fortuitous and calamitous events. First, in both countries, foreign
ministers with moderate approaches and compatible personalities came
to power.30 9 Second, massive earthquakes struck both Greece and
Turkey, generating a spontaneous outpouring of sympathy between the
two countries and each side sending assistance to the other. 310 Finally,

303.
Hope, supra note 300, at 1.
304.
See infra text accompanying notes 324.27.
305.
Leyla Boulton, 1.em's Visit Set to Bolster Growing Links with Athens, FIN.
TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2000, at 3. ("The rapprochement between two old enemies takes another

step forward ...when Ismail Oem, the Turkish foreign minister, begins the first official
visit to Greece by a Turkish foreign minister in 40 years."). In January 2000, Greece's
foreign minister, George Papandreou, had visited Turkey, as part of "dramatic
improvements in Turkey's relationship with Greece and the European Union in general."
Id.
306. Greece: Turkish WarplanesArrive, N.Y. TiMES, May 20. 2000, at A4.
307. Boulton & Hope, supra note 301, At 3.
308. Leyla Boulton, Lure of JoiningEU Focuses Cypriots'Minds OIL Reunification,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at 3.
309. Proximity Talks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999. at 13 C[Rlelations have improved
between Greece and Turkey, largely thanks to good personal contacts between their
foreign ministers.").
George Papandreou, Greece's affable foreign minister, has been flying around EU
capitals in search of a deal. Helped by his soft approach and by a swing in
Greece's public mood from hostility to sympathy after two terrible earthquakes in
Turkey (and another in Greece), the two countries, so long riven with enmity,
are-for the moment-getting along much better than usual.
Talks About Talks, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 3. Papandreou and Turkish Foreign
Miniser Qem have provided the momentum for the recent warming of relations, following a
letter from Qem in June 1999 recommending a course of pragmatic rapprochement.
Douglas Frantz, DespiteTurkish-Greek Thaw, Cyprus Quarrelis Not Melting, N.Y. TIEs.
Dec. 18, 2000, at A8.
310. Proximity Talks, supranote 309, at 3. The "outpouring of sympathy towards
Turkey after a devastating earthquake last August, helped soften Greek hostihty and
secure Turkey's status as a candidate for EU membership." Boulton. Qems Irisit to Bolster
Growing Links with Athens, supranote 305, at 3.
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on a broader, systemic level, the end of the Cold War has positioned
3 11
major world powers better to push for resolution of this crisis.
The timing was also good because warmer relations served the
interests of all three of the principal countries. Greek reconciliation with
its former foe would "remove a significant obstacle to foreign investment"
312
and give Greece more credibility as a member of the euro-zone.
Reducing the enormous military defense spending in both Turkey and
Greece will yield substantial fiscal benefits as well.3 13 Timing is also
good for the two sides on Cyprus to work together. First, the economy of
the South is booming and the North would benefit from economic
interchange, and second, the threat of enosis is now seriously lessened,
3 14
as the political elite of the South have abandoned that goal.
The immediate benefits of the rapprochement to Turkey and Cyprus
are more dramatic and direct because the change of Greek policy has
opened the way for the accessions of both countries to the European
Union. 3 15 The ultimate trigger at Helsinki for creating this opportunity
was Greece's decision to abandon its veto and permit Turkey's
candidacy. Decoupling Cyprus' accession from Greek-Turkish bilateral
issues, the Helsinki leaders agreed that Cyprus could enter the
European Union without a political settlement of its division. 3 16 This
became possible when the new Greek government under Prime Minister
Costas Simitis and Foreign Minister George Papandreou reversed that
country's position on Turkey, urging that the only way to resolve their
long standing controversies was to "deal with Turkey as an equal
partner in the Union. ' 317 The Greek Foreign Minister commented that
the Helsinki Summit decision to accept Turkey as a candidate was "a
3' 18
historic shift towards peace, security and development in our region.
Papandreou publicly explained his country's bold reversal of policy:

311.

HAMPSON, supra note 187, at 36. In particular, the United States and NATO

are less preoccupied with preserving workable relations in NATO's southern flank of
Greece and Turkey, so more pressure can be brought against these two patron powers to

resolve their differences. Id.
312.
Boulton & Hope, supra note 301, at 3.
313.
"Fear of Turkey burdens Greece with the highest per capita defence spending
in the western alliance." Id. Greece's military spending is huge at almost five percent of
GDP, but both Turkey and Greece have been in an arms race for past decade, so benefits
would accrue to both countries. Hope, supra note 300, at 1.
314.
HAMPSON, supra note 187, at 45.
315.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
316. Hope, supra note 300, at 1. ("The outcome at Helsinki may give a boost to a
new round of'proximity talks'... between the divided Cypriot leaders. Warming relations
between the parent countries would at least make the UN mediators' task easier and could
perhaps become a catalyst for a settlement.").
317. Dick Leonard, FinnishPresidencyEnds in Success, EUROPE, Feb. 2000, at 4.
("This is perhaps an echo of the French leap of faith fifty years earlier when it sought
d6tente with Germany through their joint membership of the European Coal and Steel
Community, the forerunner of the European Union.").
318.
Leyla Boulton, Delighted Turks Face Some Big Adjustments, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1999, at 10. (Importantly, it also marked the 'basis for a new relationship.).
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With the harrowing war in Kosovo still fresh in our memories, the Greek
people are critically aware of the importance of good neighborly relations.
We believe that our neighbor's strength is our strength. To exclude a
country from the full benefits of international society is a sure path to the
3 19
kind of crises we have faced for too long in Southeast Europe.

Papandreou expressed his belief that the only choice was for Turkey and
Greece to "explore new avenues for cooperation [so that] [o]ur mutual
interests can outweigh our political differences."3 20 Thus, he proclaimed,
Greece has initiated a new policy of constructive dialogue and openness
with Turkey, and he praised Turkish Foreign Minister Qem's statements
promising to resolve their territorial disputes according to international
law and work toward the Agenda 2000 accession criteria. 321 Papandreou
recommended a diplomatic solution for the Cyprus conflict, based on UN
decisions, and EU accession as "the best way to guarantee progress on
the Cyprus issue."3 22 Papandreou went further, calling on the European
Union to make an "unequivocal commitment to Turkey's European
future."3 2 3

Papandreou's strategy was to initiate bilateral cooperation with a
series of accords on low-key issues, in such uncontroversial areas as
culture, environment, and trade, avoiding potentially more divisive
3 24
issues such as mineral rights and island sovereignty in the Aegean.
The strategy proved effective. In January 2000, he and Cem met in
Ankara to sign several accords, in what (em described as "a successful
beginning toward a new era in relations" between two countries. 325 The
accords protect investments in the two countries from double taxation
and promote cooperation in environmental and tourism matters and
against organized crime and illegal immigration. 32 6 Papandreou and
Qem have deliberately focused on low-key, practical steps of cooperation
32 7
and confidence building in signing the five accords.
During the same period, Turkish President Sileyman Demirel led a
national campaign, encouraging his countrymen to donate blood and to
help find bone marrow donors for two children, one a Greek Cypriot and

319.
George Papandreou, Greece Wans Turkey to Make the Grade, INrL HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 10, 1999, at 8. ("The heart of the European ethos lies in building the

institutions and practices of inclusiveness.").
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Hope, supranote 300, at 1.
325.

Stephen Kinzer, As Relations Warm, Greece and Turkey Sign Series of Accords

N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2000, atA3 (CFouryears after Greece and Turkey went to the brink of
war over a barren islet in the Aegean Sea, their foreign ministers met here [in the Turkish
capital] to sign a series of accords and pledge themselves to peace."). Id.
326.
Id.
327.
Boulton, Qems Visit Set to Bolster Growing Links with Athens. supra note 305.
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the other a Turkish Cypriot, who suffer from leukemia. 328 In what could

only build good will, thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have
given blood in the general campaign to find marrow matches for these
3 29
children.
In Turkey, the good news from Helsinki of Turkey's acceptance into
the EU accession process brought further encouraging signs. The

Istanbul stock market "jumped an initial 11 percent, reflecting optimism
over [the] launch of a reform package backed by a $4bn loan facility from
the [IMF] which the country hopes will finally rid the country of doubledigit inflation."330 Fueling the good feelings was the success of the
current coalition government in passing 131 laws since it took office in

April

1999.331

'Turkey's hard won acceptance as a full candidate for

membership of the EU is prompting Turks to address festering problems
at home and abroad. These range from the Kurdish guerilla war to the

thirty-six year old division of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots.13 32 "[T]he incentive of eventual EU membership has provided

reformers with the most powerful weapon for change they could have
hoped for.

'3 3 3

Other government initiatives illustrate that Turkey is taking
modern reforms seriously.
For example, in December 1999, the
government took over five troubled private banks, significant because it
demonstrates the government efforts to consolidate the undercapitalized
banking sector as a part of its program to reduce the gross annual
inflation rate, as well as to push through reforms in spite of political

ramifications, as one of the banks was owned by a nephew of President
Demirel.3 34 In May 2000, the government again acted to enforce its

328.

Leyla Boulton, Turkish Tyre Workers End Strike, FIN. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at

2.
329.
Id. For example, on March 27, 2000, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots entered the
UN buffer zone to give blood "in the hope of providing a life-saving bone marrow
transplant for a Greek Cypriot boy, raising hopes that the two peoples could draw closer."
Cyprus: 25 Years of Uneasy Calm and FailedNegotiations,AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, Apr.
14, 2000.
330.
Leyla Boulton, Turkey Indulges in Rare Feelgood Spirit, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2000, at 3. The IMF subsequently raised the assistance package to ten billion dollars, in
response to a late 2000 financial crisis. Dani Rodrik, Turkey Deserves its Dollars lObn,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at 25. The World Bank added five billion dollars to help Turkey
survive its late 2000 emergency. Turkey's Escape, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at 16.
331.
Boulton, Turkey Indulges in Rare Feel Good Spirit, supra note 330, at 3
(including "better regulation of capital markets and limits on officials' immunity from
prosecution for torture and other crimes."). The current government, in power since 1999,
is "an unlikely-looking alliance of a leftish prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, the conservative
Mr. Yilmaz and a hard-nosed right-winger, Devlet Bahceli of the Nationalist Action Party,
[and] has given Turkey its most stable administration in years." The Battle-Lines in
Turkey, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2001, at 47.
332.
Boulton, supra note 330, at 3.
333.
Id.
334.
Leyla Boulton, Turkey Takes Control of Five Private Banks, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
23, 1999, at 7.
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economic reforms, ordering a sixty-day halt to a strike by the country's
three thousand tire workers, sending a message to public sector workers
to limit their demands as the country attempts to bring inflation down to
335
single digits by 2003.
In November 2000, progress continued as the World Bank offered to
work closely with Turkey's newly established anti-corruption ministry,
addressing European Commission calls for an overhaul of public
procurement and other areas of fiscal integrity as a prerequisite for
widening the EU-Turkey customs union. 336 The interior ministry has
waged "an unprecedented war on corruption... in which entire gangs
have been arrested, and some very big fish netted." 33 7 "Almost a year
into an ambitious three-year disinflation programme, confidence
remains high that economic reforms launched this January will stabile
338
and enhance growth and investment."
public finances
Commentators praised the IMF's decision to provide further loans
to Turkey in late 2000, noting that the government had put into place
"many structural reforms, including privatisation and financial
restructuring."339 The IMF also hailed the accelerated Turkish reform,
including the adoption of "legislation liberalising the state-dominated
energy sector and the official go-ahead for 29 long-delayed private energy
''3 40
investment projects.
The OECD observed in its January 2001 survey that Turkey's late
2000 financial trauma made reform policies stronger, "due to renewed
341
momentum that has been given to the structural reform programme."
In its most recent progress report on Turkey's efforts toward accession,
the European Union concluded that "considerable progress" had been
achieved toward the economic critieria for accession. 342 The lowest
inflation rate since 1986, a strong annual growth rate, modest but
successful privatization, reforms in various sectors, and anti-corruption
efforts suggest economic and political progress. 343 Prime Minister

335.

Boulton, Turkish Tyre Workers End Strike, supra note 328.

336.
Leyla Boulton, Aid for Turkish Push on Corruption,FIN. TIES, Nov. 20. 2000,
at 4.
337.
The Battle-Lines in Turkey, supranote 331, at 47.
338.
Turkey: Banking Fintnce and Intestment: On Target for an Economic
Turnaround,FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at 1. But see infra text accompanying notes 34245 (explaining that the economy struggles through catharsis of the reforms).
339.
Last Chance for Turkey, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at 14. Even the stateowned alcohol and tobacco monopoly has been reformed. Leyla Boulton. Turkey Acts on
Raki Monopoly, FIN. TNIMs, Jan. 13, 2001, at 5.
340.
Leyla Boulton, .AIF Hails Turkish Reform Ahead of New Loan Tranche,FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, at 2.
341.
Leyla Boulton, Turkey Praisedfor Tightening Policies after FinancialCrisis,
FIN. TImEs, Jan. 12, 2001, at 3.
342.
Turkey: Banking Finance and InvestmenL On Target for an Economic
Turnaround,supranote 338, at 1.
343.
Id. The improvements must continue to produce a "fully functioning market
economy in which prices, as well as trade, are liberalised, and an enforceable legal system
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Ecevit's 2001 National Programme for EU accession, his strategy for
leading the country toward the accession criteria, has been called by one
official "the most important project since Ataturk's revolutionary
reforms of the 1920s and 1930s."3 44 U.S. President George W. Bush
underscored the importance of the gains Turkey has achieved in
economic reforms, as he gave assurances of U.S. support during the
3 45
February 2001 devaluation of the lira.

In the field of human rights, again modest progress appears to have
been made, though some pessimistic reports continue.3 46 Abdullah
Ocalan has not been executed, Turkey's justice minister has promised
that the death penalty itself will be abandoned soon, and the deaths "in
police custody and under suspicious circumstances have all but
ceased. '34 7 Turkish officials announced in late 2000 that some twenty
thousand prisoners would be released as part of reforms of the prison
system. 3 48 In another positive sign, a military court unanimously
acquitted an author of charges she had insulted the military by
publishing a book critical of the Kurdish war.3 49 Qem insists that
progressive legislation, "such as a new civil code enshrining equal rights
'350
for men and women, is already in front of Parliament.
A surprising sign of stability in Turkey's present coalition and new
cooperation among Turkey's political parties emerged from the
presidential elections in Spring 2000. Following the refusal of the
Turkish Parliament to approve the Ecevit government's proposal for a
constitutional amendment to allow the incumbent president Demeril to
serve another term, many people feared instability. 351 Surprisingly,
Ecevit "won the support of all [the political] parties" for his fall-back
nominee to succeed to the presidency, Necdet Sezer, the secular chief

is in place." Id. A banking crisis arose in December 2000, forcing the government to
finally "offer private investors management control over TiIrk Telekom, the most
important state-owned enterprise slated for privatisation." Leyla Boulton, Turkish Talks
on Bank Crisis With IMF Begin, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at 8.
344.
The Battle-Lines in Turkey, supra note 331, at 48.
345.
Leyla Boulton & Richard Wolffe, Bush Offers Ecevit Backingas Lira Falls, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at 2.
346.
Darker Clouds,a Few Gleams Yet, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 2000, at 48. The most
encouraging development for many Turks was the election of Ahmet Nacdet Sezer as
Turkey's new President. Mr. Sezer has called for numerous democratic reforms. Id.
347.
Id. "Few believe [Ocalan] will be hanged," and his trial was described by
commentators as "largely fair and free" at least partially because military judges were
removed from the court. The Battle-Lines in Turkey, supra note 331, at 47.
348.
Turkey: 20,000 Go Free, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at As.
349.
Douglas Frantz, Turkish JournalistClearedof Insulting Army, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2000, at A7.
350.
Leyla Boulton, Turkey Plans New Push on EUAccession, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2000, at 3.
351.
Stephen Kinzer, Turkey's Highest-Ranking Judge Is Likely to Be Next
President, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at A7.
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judge of the country's constitutional court.3 52 "This unique show of
solidarity," coupled with the present government coalition's longevity,
suggests that the country may be willing to make the needed "transition
to full democracy by shedding its largely undemocratic and outdated
laws. 35 3
Following his election, Sezer promised to strengthen the rule of law
and secular government during his seven year term.354 On May 16, in
his inaugural remarks, Sezer urged Turkey to modernize, and he
proclaimed that '"Turks deserved to live in a freer and more prosperous
world." 355 Sezer is "an unpretentious new president ... [who] has
warmed millions of Turkish hearts" and is, "for the first time since
Ataturk, . . beating the army in the opinion polls." 35 6 This
inauguration, according to one commentator, "cap[s] a year of
extraordinary change... " in Turkey.357 Once in office, Sezer showed
mettle quickly when he refused to extend the term of "Turkey's fiercely
anti-Islamic chief prosecutor," suggesting more tolerance for the
3 58
future.
Prime Minister Ecevit has maintained an unusually stable
government for two years, "pulling the country out of chaos." For
example, the IMF has supported a four billion dollar stabilization
program, fostering privatization and decreasing inflation-previously
approaching one hundred percent annually-the Turkish Parliament
passed the reform program, and the fifteen year old war against the

352.

Metin Munir &Vincent Boland, Sezer Set to Become Turkey's President,FIN.
at 3.

TINMES, Apr. 26, 2000,

353.

Id. The present Turkish coalition formed in 1998 has been surprisingly stable.

DevletBahceli, Turkey's Latest PoliticalPivot, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14,2000, at 64. Turkey's

current "coalition government, despite its flaws, is the most stable and reform.minded
Turkey has had for years, and deserves support" Turkey's Troubles, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4,

2000, at 14.
354. The Turkish Parliament elected Sezer as President in the final round on May
5, 2000. Turkey's ParliamentSelects Top Judge to Be Country's President,N.Y. TIMEs,

May 6, 2000, at A4.
355.
Leyla Boulton, Reformist Sezer Sworn in as Turkey's President,FIN. TIMEs,
May 17, 2000, at 3.
356. The Battle.Lines in Turkey, supranote 331, at 47.
357. Stephen Kinzer, Turks Have a Sense of a Swing Toward a FullerDemocracy,
N.Y. TINES, May 15, 2000, at A3. The article notes Sezer's endorsement of free speech, an
end to restrictions against the Kurdish language, and the military's subjection to the rule
of law. Id. See also Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a West ward.LookingTurk, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18,
2000, at 64.
Sezer has clearly shown that he is prepared to stand up for democratic values and
the rule of law, whether or not the men in uniform like it. He has shov.-n his
independence from the military twice rejecting their proposed decrees enabling the

government to fire thousands of civil servants accused of political incorrectness
regarding Islam or the Kurdish question.
358.

The Battle.Lines in Turkey, supra note 331, at 48.
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Kurds has ended. 359 The keystone to the reversal of fortunes was the
European Union's decision to overrule its bar of Turkey from
negotiations for eventual EU accession, "in a turnaround that thrilled
nearly every Turk .... ,,360 In May 2000, "Turkish enthusiasm for EU
membership [was] at an all-time high."'3 6' A squabble during NATO
exercises in October 2000 was smoothed over, and, as the year 2000
ended, tourism had doubled over the previous year and bilateral trade
has nearly done the same. 362 Greek Foreign Minister, Papandreou,
proclaimed that the countries are closer than they have been in forty
36 3
years, while insisting that there must be some solution about Cyprus.
Sezer pushed for further reforms as 2001 progressed, confronting
Prime Minister Ecevit for insufficient pursuit of corrupt politicians,
while "a long-awaited law" on liberalizing Turkey's energy markets
364
finally was enacted by Parliament.
Turks view the dis-inflation program is part of a transition from an
introverted, statist and authoritarian past to a liberal, democratic and
cosmopolitan future.... Reforms that seemed unthinkable even a couple
of years ago, such as lifting the ban on teaching and broadcasting in
Kurdish, are now the stuff of parliamentary subcommittees and
newspaper editorials. In other words, the process of accession has taken
365
on a bureaucratic momentum of its own.

The confrontation between Sezer and Ecevit caused Turkish
financial markets to stumble, and the catharsis produced an agreement
of cooperation advancing reforms even further.3 66 Both government and
military leaders agreed to "remove obstacles" to Kurdish language
broadcasting and education, as well as to increase the number of
civilians on the powerful Security Council. 36 7 These reforms signal a
fundamental change taking place in Turkey, making EU accession
plausible.
The critical element of the equation for peace on Cyprus and in the
entire eastern Mediterranean may be the energy generated by EU
enlargement for Cyprus and Turkey. Some fear the consequences if a
Member State would, after all of Turkey's reform efforts to satisfy
Western demands, veto Turkey's ultimate accession, the rejection would

359.
Kinzer, Turks Have a Sense of Swing Toward a FullerDemocracy, supranote
359, at A3.

360.

Id.

361.
Douglas Frantz, This Turk Will Knock on Europe's Door, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2000, at A12.
362.
Douglas Frantz, Cyprus Limits Greece-Turkey Warming, INT'L HERALD TRID.,
Dec. 19, 2000, at 5.
363.
Id.
364.
Turkey's Future, On the Brink Again, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2001 at 25. Tho

spirited Sezer "is said to have thrown a copy of the constitution at.. ." Ecevit. Id.
365.
Id. at 26.
366.
Leyla Boulton, Turkey Acts to Salvage Campaign for EU Membership, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at 8.
367.
Id.
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"embitter relations for decades ....endanger the country's hard won
democratic stability, and revive old enmities."3 68 Reversing today's
peaceful cooperation and reverting to ancient hostilities would also cause
a calamitous effect on Cyprus: "Any hopes of peace in Cyprus, and
defusing the tension with Greece, would be lost."3 6 9 Moreover, Cyprus is
one of the most prepared for accession according to the Copenhagen
criteria.3 7 0 The European Commission in its 2000 Regular Report 371 on
Cyprus' Progress Toward Accession commended Cyprus' progress toward
fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria,3 72 concluding that Cyprus has
met the political and economic criteria with a democracy that places
emphasis on human rights and due process of law and a strong
economy.3 73 The Commission praised the substantive progress in
various key areas of the acquis, such as internal market, agriculture,
3 74
transport, and other requirements.
The division of Cyprus featured prominently in the Commission's
report, and it determined that accession would be more inclusive if the
Turkish Cypriot delegation would come to the negotiating table, insuring
that Turkish Cypriot concerns are included and helping to advance the
accession process.37 5 The 2000 Regular Report also noted that contacts
between the two communities had increased over the past year,
including meetings of trade unions, professional groups, media, women's
organizations, youth events, and even political party representatives. 376
A recent poll indicated that ninety percent of Turkish Cypriots favor
377
accession to the European Union.
An Accession Partnership between the European Union and the
Republic of Cyprus was established by the Council in March 2000, and
several Financial Protocols have infused several million dollars of aid to

368. Quentin Peel, Cultures Collide as Turkey Meets Europe, FIN. TLES, Mar. 9.
2000, at 23.
369. Id.
370.
Cyprus leads the candidate countries in satisfying the acquis, with sixteen
chapters closed. Dick Leonard, Enlargement. The "Target Date"Debate,EUROPE, Sept.
2000, at 4. As one commentator curiously put it: Cyprus is better objectively qualified to
join the EU than Greece or Italy. EUEnlargement,ECONOMIT, Dec. 18, 1999, awailableat
1999 WL 29812041.
371. The Commission is required to make regular reports to the Council reviewing
each applicant country's progress toward the Copenhagen criteria for accession, and
especially its adoption of the acquis. 2000 COMMISSION ON CYPRUS' PROGRESS TOWARD
ACCESSION REGULAR REP. 5.
372. See Conclusions of the Presidency (Copenhagen European Council. June 1993).
BULL.EuR. COMUiTrIES, June 1993, point 1.13 [hereinafter 1993 Copenhagen Summit

Conclusions].
373.

2000 Regular Report, supra note 203 at 93.

374.
375.

Id. at 90-92.
Id. at 10.

376. Id. at 21. The UN is also urging both communities to cooperate on projects of
mutual concern, such as cultural heritage, public health, and natural resources. Id.

377.

Id. at 18.
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the island. 37 8 In September 2000, Cyprus submitted its first National
Program for the Adoption of the Acquis to the Commission, outlining its
379
strategy for progress to accession.
Thus far, the regional rapprochement has not advanced as well on
the specific Cyprus issue. The "proximity talks" between the two
communities on Cyprus have continued, but with little progress. 380 In
November 2000, at a fifth round of UN-led talks, Kofi Annan offered new
suggestions for a federated solution, with the two sides working together
in a joint government as a single state. 38 1 The TRNC rejected the
proposals as leading nowhere, and Turkey's Foreign Minister Ismail
Qem reacted more strongly, warning that the proposal if implemented
could lead to violence between Cyprus' Greek and Turkish
communities.3 8 2 Greece, the Greek Cypriots, and the United Nations
383
favor the federal plan, which includes two zones and two communities.
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit also refused the EU recommendation
that Turkey support the UN two-zone federation proposal for Cyprus,
insisting that membership in the European Union could not be tied to
384
the Cyprus issue.
A week later, Denktas threatened to pull out from the sixth round of
talks, unless the United Nations moderated its settlement proposal. 385
The United Nations has agreed to the concept of "two separate states"
and even the presence of Turkish troops on the island, but Denktas was
angered by proposals suggesting that Greek Cypriots might recover
property lost in the 1974 war without mentioning an exchange of
38 6
property for the Turkish Cypriots as well.

Following the Cyprus talks in November, Turkey advanced its
cooperation with EU countries by volunteering substantial military
personnel and equipment to the EU's newly forming rapid-reaction
defense force. 38 7 The offer was conditional on Turkey, a strategically

378.
379.
380.

Id. at 8. This was done by using loans, grants, and risk-capital funds. Id.
Id.
Turkish PM Slams UN Document on Cyprus, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov.

11, 2000 [hereinafter Turkish PM].
381.

Id.

382.

Qem Warns that Annan's ProposalsMight Cause Ethnic Unrest in Cyprus,

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 13, 2000. (The author describes the issue as possibly

becoming "an intifada, a new Bosnia or a new Kosovo.") (emphasis added).
383.
Turkish PM,supra note 380.
384.
Douglas Frantz, Turkey: Plan For CyprusRejected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000,
at A6. Timing was problematic: the European Commission's insistence that Turkey
support the UN proposal as a condition for beginning accession talks came the same day as
the UN's new proposal, thus giving some the impression that the EU and the UN were
ganging up on the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Leyla Boulton, Turk Cypriot LeaderMay
Quit UN Talks, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2000, at 2.
385.
Boulton, Turk Cypriot Leader May Quit UN Talks, supra note 384.
386. Id.
387.
Offering a mechanized brigade of up to five thousand men, thirty-six F.16
warplanes, two transport planes and a small flotilla of ships. Michael R. Gordon, Turkey
Offers Troops for New EuropeanForce, With a Proviso, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at A5.
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located NATO ally equipped with a large military, receiving in return a
responsible role in the force. 388 Turkey's position as a full partner in the
consensus-based NATO magnifies this thorny issue because of plans for
NATO to work closely with the EU defense force. 389 The Eureopan
Union has offered an institutional arrangement with NATO to overcome
Turkey's concerns, and NATO leaders have assured Turkey of its role as
"a major player in the European security equation, 390 but resolution of
39 1
the issue was left for later.
The issues are sensitive. In November 2000, a meeting of EU
foreign ministers was brought to rapid halt when Papandreou insisted
that reference to the Greek-Turkish differences in boundary disputes
and on Cyprus be included in a proposed "road map" document for
Turkey's EU membership.3 92 Turkish officials had warned EU ministers
the day before not to include such apparently sensitive references in the
accession partnership document or Turkey would "reconsider its position
on a number of issues," including the use of NATO assets for the EU
393
defense force.
The complexity of these conflicting relationships makes the problem
inscrutable: A sense of betrayal grows in Turkey over the Greek and
therefore EU position re-linking the start of Turkey's accession
negotiations, while Turkey's veto ability as full NATO member
endangered planned progress of the new EU defense force in the eastern
Mediterranean.3 94 Turkey is one of four NATO countries not in the
European Union, and Turkish leaders reacted strongly when the new
conditions were added, insisting that only the original Helsinki
395
conditions were legitimate.
Just forty-eight hours before the Nice summit was to open, an
eleventh hour accord was struck, "fudging the wording on thorny Cyprus
and Aegean issues," thus defusing the tension for progress in cooperation

The offer was the largest offer from a non-EU contributor; Norway pledged thuty-five
thousand, Slovakia 450, and Estonia an infantry battalion. Alexander Nicoll, Turkeyls
troops on Offer to New EU Force, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at 3.
388.
Gordon, supranote 387. Turkey maintains the largest army inEurope. Layla
Boulton, NATO Seeks to Reassure Turkey on EU Force, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24. 2000, at 3.
389.
Nicoll, supranote 387.
390.
Boulton, NATO Seeks to Reassure Turkey on EU Force,supra note 38S (quoting
George Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO).
391.
Nicoll, supranote 387.
392.
Peter Norman, MinistersAgree on Aid for Western Balkans, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2000, at 10.
393.
Leyla Boulton, Ankara Warns EU Not to Refer to Dispute with Athens. FtN.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at 4. Turkey has "already agreed to take the boundary diaputes to
the International Court of Justice by 2004" and argued "that it should not be subjected to
different criteria from [the other applicants]." Id.
394.
Leyla Boulton, Turks Feel Growing Sentse of Betrayal over EU Demands, FIN.
TIiEs, Nov. 29, 2000, at 2.
395.
EU-NATO Cooperation Clouded by Turkey's Opposition, AGaFNcE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 4, 2000. The other three non-EU members of NATO are Hungary, Poland,
and the Czech Republic. Id.
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on the European defense force. 396 Carefully worded adjustments to an
existing document addressing the Aegean and Cyprus disputes
harmonized it with the Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit, and Greek
and Turkish leaders were praised for their cooperation, as Greek Foreign
Minister Papandreou proclaimed: "We have opened up a new path and a
'397

new road.
The December 2000 French Presidency Conclusions from the Nice
Summit urged further collaboration in 2001:
The European Council welcomed and strongly supports the efforts of the
United Nations Secretary-General to achieve an overall agreement on the
Cyprus problem consistent with the UN Security Council Resolutions and
to arrive at a positive conclusion of the process initiated in December
1999. It appeals to all the parties concerned to contribute to the efforts
398
made to this effect.

IV.

THEORY OF ACCESSION COLLABORATION

The European Union is a unique venture, with no model in history. Only
399
together, through the Union, can we meet tomorrow's challenges.

This Article proposes a new, European based approach to the
political and legal dilemma presented by today's divided Cyprus.
Current events offer a special moment of opportunity in which the
principal parties to the dispute are motivated and situated for breaking
the present impasse and for which the European Union may rise to its
aspiration as peacemaker, prosperity builder, and world leader. This
theory of constructive collaboration emphasizes a pragmatic flexibility in
adapting potentially anachronistic and unproductive applications of

396.
NATO Defense Ministers Meet after Last-Minute EU Accord with Turkey,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 5, 2000.
397.
Peter Norman & Leyla Boulton, Deal agreed on Turkish Path to EU, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at 2. French Prime Minister, Hubert V6drine, called the agreement "a
major source of satisfaction," while Enlargement Commissioner Giinter Verheugen added
that it would "initiate a fundamental democratic change in Turkey" in cooperation with the
EU. Id.
398
Presidency Conclusions, supra note 3, at 14.
399.
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, Dec. 10 and 11, 1999,
Millennium Declaration, Annex I. The unique nature of the EU is frequently noted. The
freely chosen integration of autonomous nations is "an experiment without precedent in
the history of ideas." William Pfaff, France and Europe Are Doing Some Things Right,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 20, 1998, at 6 (quoting Harvard Professor Joseph Weiler). With
unprecedented originality: fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and
diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historical phenomena, a studied change
of regime. It is the reverse of conquest and quite different both from incremental
adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent
of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of
Internationalisation?,at http:l/eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-018a.html (quoting DUCH9NE,
JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INDEPENDENCE 20 (1994)).
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international law, 400 promoting models of creativity and functionalism,
which have evolved from successes in European integration, to be
energized with the current impetus of European enlargement. 40 1
Reconciliation of the multilayered, deeply embedded conflicts
presented in Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean requires a fresh
approach to "political problem-solving beyond the nation state."40 2 The
successes of regional cooperation around the globe expand the spectrum
of theoretical and practical bases for innovative, productive new thinking
toward resolving old issues. The advance of European integration,
accompanied by similar but more modest progress in Asia and North and
South America, 40 3 has transformed the dialogue and the scope of
transnational collaboration. Any serious strategy to confront the Cyprus
enigma should accommodate this new political and legal reality.
In today's new context of "debordered governance," states are
increasingly embedded within "transnational, supranational and multilevel systems of governance" with political problem solving inseparably
bound up with law and lawmaking.' 04 The European Union itself is in
the middle of inventing a new political form of government, a union of
intergovernmental and supranational cooperation, a form without a
name, "something more than a confederation but less than a federation
in an association of sovereign states which pool their sovereignty in
limited areas or to varying degrees."'40 5 In this way, today's Europe

400.
See infra text accompanying notes 440-60 (discussing Cyprus and the norms of
international law regarding recognition, secession, and self-determination).
401.
Accession has often been recommended as a catalyst to promote reform in
applicant countries. See, eg., DODD, supra note 215, at 91. But only now, after the
Helsinki and Nice summits, is the essential Turkish role in the enlargement equation and
the Cypriot conflict situated for movement.
402.
Michael Zdrn & Dieter Wolf, EuropeanLaw and IntertutionalRegimes: The
Featuresof Law Beyond the Nation State, 5 EUR. L.J. 272 (1999).
403.
Laffan, supranote 399, at 1. "The acceleration of internationalisation in the
1990s has profound implications for political and economic order at the international.
regional and national levels... [and] [o]ne important characteristic of contemporary
internationalisation is the increasing prominence of regional organization. .. " such as
NAFTA, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation), ASEAN (Association of South East
Asian Nations), the Southern Common Market in Latin America, and the "most extensive
and intensive form of regionalism"-the EU. Id. Africa is the natural situs of eleven
regional groups, such as the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, and the
Southern African Customs Union. Afrabet Soup, EcONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 77. See
also Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizationsin Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. L
REV. 235, 266 (1997) (examining the new regional role in intervening to resolve conflicts,
observing that "[t]he newfound acceptance by the international community of regional
action to stop civil wars has resulted in the formation of new norms in international law
and relations.").
404.
Zirn & Wolf, supranote 402, at 292.
405.
Larry Siedentop, A Crisis of Legitimacy, FIN. TwiEs, Oct. 24, 2000, at 27.
"[L]ess than a superstate but more than an alliance: an unprecedented, unique, and
horribly complex combination of the supranational and the intergovernmental, of economic
integration and political cooperation." TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, HISTORY OF THE PRESE.NTr
133 (1999).
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406
presents an innovative example of shared sovereignty.
Amid Europe's denationalism today, older "[s]ituations of
governance.., in a postnational setting, have been cast asunder, as the
nation state is being incorporated within an interwoven multilevel
system." 40 7 Even the familiar dichotomy between intergovernmental
cooperation and supranational institutions has become passe, as today's
European Union discovers that it "cannot function well unless its own
institutions work closely with national governments '40 8 as well as other
organizations. 40 9 "The [European Union] is transforming politics and
government at both European and national levels into a system of multilevel, non-hierarchal, deliberative and apolitical governance. '410 Thus,
evolving new forms gain acceptance and offer models for the flexibility
needed today in Cyprus.
The trend in transnational cooperation must also be viewed in
4 11
context of another evolution relevant to the conflict in Cyprus.
Overlapping the broad postnational movement toward regionalism is the
concurrent, anomalous rise of sovereign small states, a counterforce
reflecting perhaps the culmination of the decolonial period. In recent
years, a proliferation of micro-states have won sovereignty, UN
4 12
membership, and other recognition in the international system.

It may seem premature to speak of the demise of the nation-state when
the last decade has seen the proliferation of ever-smaller nation-states
throughout Eastern Europe and Asia and the demand for secession from

406. Michael Prowse, Party's Over for Small States with Attitude, FIN. TIMEs, Mar.
3, 2001 at 24 (comparing Britain's autonomy to that of the state of California).
407.
Zirn & Wolf, supra note 402, at 272.
408.
GRANT, supranote 1, at 16. The EU today is "more a quasi-federation of nation
states than a quasi-federal state, even if it has some of the characteristics of the
latter ..." Id. at 8. And externally, the EU advocates further innovation, urging Serbia
and Montenegro to remain together fashioning a "new constitutional arrangement." EU
Approves February TroikaMission to Yugoslavia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 22, 2001.
409.
Offering another example of novel merging of forms is the planned cooperation
between NATO and the EU's proposed defense rapid reaction force, in which the two will
be "meshed together with a minimum of duplication." Alexander Nicoli, EU Offers Turkey
a Say in ProposedNew Force, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at 3.
410. Jan Zielonka, Enlargementand the Finality of European Integration, (Jean
Monnet Working Paper No. 7/00), at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/00f080103.html. "Effective governance is today about recognising complexity, flexibility, and
dispersion." Id. at www.jeanmonnetprogram.orgpapers/OO/OOfO8Ol.html.
411.
The Cyprus conflict "reaffirm[s] that the world of nations is a global
community caught amidst forces of independence and interdependence." JOSEPH, supra
note 39, at 133. Peoples strive for "independent states encompassing national
individuality, shared values, and common interests, while on the other hand, patterns of
interdependence inherent in the international system dictate interaction that results in
conflict and co-operation, and the creation of international organizations." Id.
412.
Barry Bartmann, The Quest for Legitimacy, InternationalStatus of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, in CYPRUS, THE NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVES 260, 262
(Clement H. Dodd ed., 1999) (noting some "with truly dimunitive populations such as
Tuvalu (9,000) or Palau (16,000).").
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national movements in countries as diverse as Canada, Yugoslavia, Sri
4 13
Lanka, Indonesia, Russia, Spain, and India.

While the international community resists coercive changes in
international borders, it condones them "as an option of last resort" in
states where ethnic divisions appear to be irreconcilable. 4 14 Since the
implosion of the Soviet Union, a new climate has evolved for the selfdetermination of minorities locked in larger states, such as seen in
Ukraine, and the Slovakian, Slovenian, and Croatian separations, in
41
which new democratic governments legitimized independence. 5
416 Eritrea,4 17 and other examples amplify the exception. 418
Bangladesh,
The international community is becoming more sensitive to minority
groups and more generous in accepting concepts of derogation and
419
devolution.

413.

James D. Wilets, The Demiseof the Nation.State Towards a New Theory of he

State UnderInternatioitalLaw, 17 BERKELY J. INVL L. 193, 193 (1999). See also Cas I.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 643.47 (1990)
(describing post-1989 vigorous secession movements in Europe).
414.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 142. "The international community clearly
favors countermajoritarian political settlements over coerced shifts in international
boundaries ... [as] a way to accommodate the conflicting demands of competing
subnational groups without creating new external boundaries, and thereby inviting violent
demands for territorial change by subnational groups around the world." Id. Yet, it is
evidently willing to condone such territorial changes as a measure of last resort, as for
example inYugoslavia. Most states disfavored the non-consensual breakup of Yugoslavia,
until dissolution appeared inevitable, when most states promptly reversed position with
approval. Id. at 142 n.2. See also NECATIGIL, supranote 106, at 399-400 (dicussmg the
collapse of federal systems such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in which deep-rooted
ethnic difference have not been reconciled).
415.
Bartmann, supra note 412, at 264-65. Slovenia is now in the forefront of
accession candidates.
Former UN Secretary-General Boutrous Boutros-Ghah
acknowledged the pressures for fragmentation and the possibility of a future global sy.,tem
of perhaps four hundred states. In May 1992, the UN admitted Slovenia. Bosnia and
Hercegovinia, and Croatia, which had seceded from the Yugoslav federation. Yehuda
Blum, UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break, 86 A:% J IN'rL L
830, 830 (1992).
416.
LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIACY OFSELF-DETEidIN.%T10.- 211
(1978).
417.
A thirty year war culminated in the 1991 overthrow of the government, leading
to consensual division of the country. David Wippman, Treaty-Based Iiuer'lztioll. 10
Can,Say No?, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 607, 664 n.199 (1995).
418.
The UN has faced the secession problem several other times: In 1917, Pakistan
was partitioned from India and was admitted to the UN in the same year. Wippman.
supranote 417, at 664 n.6. Subsequently, Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan in 1971 and
was admitted to the UN in 1974. Id. Syria had seceded from the United Arab Republic in
1961, maintaining its former seat, prior to the creation of the UAR. Id. at 664 n.7. For
admittance of former Soviet Republics, see id. at 664 n.9.
419.
Bartmann, supra note 412, at 281. Bartmann notes increased respect for
smaller communities, specifically citing many smaller states including Greenland,
Palestine, Montenegro, Bermuda, Aruba, Catalonia, and others. Id. at 277-81. 'The era
when majorities dominating minorities with impunity appears to be over." BOR%',O1EC,
supranote 49, at xv.

1342

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1293

These "seemingly conflicting centrifugal forces of nationalism and
centripetal forces of confederation 420 are compressed in Cyprus because
of its discrete size and the region's high definition of the East-West
ethnic conflict. This pressurized situation requires reconciliation before
long-term equilibrium can be achieved. Repeated failures to resolve this
conflict painfully illustrate the need for a responsive, forward-looking
basis for collaboration between the majority and minority communities.
The new approaches must focus above different social and political
cultures, elevating their common, core values into a collaborative vision.
Traditional notions of international law framing this dispute 4 21 have
proved impotent, and the old "classic '422 model for European integration
and accession, the product of past nationalistic experiences, is illequipped for the complex issues presented in Cyprus' case. As the
overall Eastern enlargement requires adaptation both within the
European Union and by applicant countries, 42 3 so should the model of
collaboration adapt and become more flexible for such a difficult case as
Cyprus.
The traditional UN and EU position has been often posited that the
Cyprus conflict must be resolved according to established rules of
international law, condemning the illegal invasion by Turkey, fallacious
demands for sovereignty by the TRNC, and disregard of the United
Nations Charter. 424 The only legal solution according to this argument
is for the Turkish Cypriot community to rejoin the Greek Cypriot
majority in a federal state, carefully designed to maintain the statehood
of the Republic of Cyprus under international law with emphasis placed
on the territorial integrity and unity of the present Greek Cypriot
425
state.
On the other hand, the Turkish side has argued that the use of force
in 1974 was necessary to maintain the balance between the two
communities and was therefore authorized by the Treaty establishing

420.
James D. Wilets, The Demiseof the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the
State Under InternationalLaw, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 193, 193 (1999).
421.
See infra text accompanying notes 438-41. See also European Law and
InternationalRegimes: The Featuresof Law Beyond the Nation State, 5 EUROPEAN L.J.
272 (1999) (discussing the "low quality" of international law, compared to "high quality"
national law and "a lesser quality" European Law).
422.
REDMOND, supra note 41, at 217.
423.
As is fully discussed in EU literature, the old Community of nine or fifteen is
structurally unprepared for 25 members. See, e.g., European Commission, Agenda 2000,
For a Stronger and Wider Union, in E.U. Bull, no. 12.97,56 (Supplement 5/97), at 24-28,
135-36.
424.

See KYPROS CHRYSOSTOMIDEs, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS:

A STUDY IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-16, 479-94 (2000) (arguing that Cyprus is the victim of foreign
intervention, with thirty-six percent of the country under foreign military occupation).
425.
See id. at 12. ("The Cyprus Government has the legal and political duty to
actively hinder any efforts leading to the consolidation of a purported 'secessionist unit,'
fomented by external military support, on its territory.").
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the island's independence. 426 Further, the Turkish Cypriots insist that
the Greek inspired and supported coup violated the Treaty's guarantee
of Cyprus' existence as an independent state. 427 Turks and Turkish
Cypriots resist Greek Cypriot insistence on the unity of the island by
reminding everyone that the island has only been united when under
colonial rule, either British or Ottoman, except for the first three years
of independence in the 1960s. 428 Even the Treaty of Guarantee has been
claimed to violate the international law principle of jus cogens in that
Article IV empowers the guarantor powers to intervene in the internal
affairs of the Republic under certain circumstances, though such
intervention in a state's internal affairs contravenes basic UN principles
of state sovereignty. 429 Ultimately, the Turkish Cypriot position
strongly resists any return to the fate of the Turkish minority before the

intervention in 1974.430
The international community and Greek Cyprus favor resolution of
the present conflict within a bi-zonal federation, but Turkish Cyprus and
the Republic of Turkey have publicly insisted that the island may be
reunited only when the TRNC is acknowledged and then as a
confederation of equal states.43 1 These polar positions have been
supported by divergent legal arguments, their underlying political
interests, as well as the inconsistent application of international law.
Experience teaches that the application of international law
norms-as with any law-can be ambiguous, and this ambiguity has led
to the predictable, unproductive debate over Cyprus. International law
provides no easy answer to the problem of separatist efforts, as

426.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 143. See also BOROWIEC, supra note 49, at xiv
427.
Wippman, supranote 51, at 143. Wippman further confirms Greek instigation
and support of the coup. Id. at 163 n.146.
428.
BOROWIEC, supra note 49, at xiv. "Turkey believes that it mubt protect itL
ethnic minority on Cyprus from Greek domination and its army is also there to make sure
that Cyprus does not become a Greek military bastion only 40 miles from the Turkmih
coast." Id. at xiii. Greeks would prefer the pre-invasion status quo in which the -the
Turkish Cypriots were an inconvenient but powerless minority." Id.
429.
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations provides that "all peoples have the right to freely determine, without external
influence, their political status...." GA. Res. 2625, Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR. Supp. No. 21,
at 121, U.N. Doc. A15217 (1970). The Treaties founding the Republic of Cyprus have been
criticized by the Republic of Cyprus numerous times as violating international law becau-e
they were imposed on the Cypriot people as they were striving for independence from
outside powers, emphasizingthat no Cypriots participated in the drafting of the treaties or
the constitution. See, eg., Marios L. Evriviades, The Legal Dimensions of the Cyprus
Conflict, 10 TEX. IN'L L.J. 227, 256 (1975).
430.
See BOROWIEC, supra note 49, at xiv. ("Since 1974, when the Turkish army
carved out a portion of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed a securnty that they are
unlikely to give up.").
431.
EU Won't Admit Cyprus Before Settlement: Denltash, AGENCE FtL%!xcL
PRESSE, Feb. 13, 2000.
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"opposing principles" promote contrary interests and results. 4 32 While
the positive law status and the applicability of each peoples' right to
their own land are debatable, so uncertainty surrounds the extent of
existing states' rights to maintain their territorial integrity. 43 3 The
international community's response to this repeating challenge has been
"ambiguous and inconstant. '43 4 At the beginning of the twentieth
century, "self-determination was not considered a rule of international
law and was selectively applied so as not to interfere with colonial
control exercised by world powers. '435 Subsequently, self-determination
was included in the United Nations Charter, though not as an express
right to gain independence through self-determination. 43 6 There is a
natural concern about the conflicting international interests in
promoting self-determination of peoples versus the security needs to
437
protect against disintegration of the current international system.
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations articulates the duty to respect the right of
self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter. 438 Many other
international instruments, treaties, and other documents likewise
confirm the right.439 At the same time, UN Member States stress the
importance of the unity of states, but then recognize accomplished
secession after the fact. 440 "Political philosophers struggle with the

432.
Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determnination:A TerritorialInterpretation,
16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177, 177-78 (1991). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalismand
Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1991).
433.
See Brilmayer, supra note 432, at 177-78.
434.
Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of
New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 590 (1996). See also Edward Canuel, Nationalism,Self.
Determination,and NationalistMovements: Exploring the Palestinianand Quebec Drives
for Independence, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 85, 86 (1997) (stating that ambiguity and
uncertainty characterize these norms in international law and scholarship).
435.
Suzanne Palmer, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Should the United
States Recognize It as an Independent State?, 4 B.U. INYL L.J. 423, 426 (1986). For history
of self-determination, see Eric Kolodner, The Futureof the Right to Self.Determination,10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 153, 154-57 (1994).
436.
See INGRID DETTER DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT
STATE 7 (1974). U.N. Charter article 1, para. 2 and article 55 articulate the purpose of the
UN "[tjo develop friendly relations among nations based on ... equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples .... Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66-67,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
It has been argued that this inclusion elevated selfdetermination to a fundamental principle of customary international law. Robert A.
Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-PoliticalInquiry, 1975 DETRIOT C. L. REV. 71.
437.
Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 857, 857 (1994).
438.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
annex to G.A. Res.2625 (XXV), adopted without vote on Oct. 24, 1970.
439.
McCorquodale, supra note 437, at 858.
440.
Ratner, supra note 434, at 590. As one commentator noted:
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circumstances under which secession and dissolution are desirable;
international law declares the lack of either a blanket right to, or
prohibition against, secession and seemingly relegates its achievement
to a pure power calculus." 441 The notion that "the legitimacy of a claim
to self-determination can be tested by the degree of success that attends
the claimants' undertaking is probably the prevailing view among most
international jurists., 442 The modern view is more restrictive in
accepting self-determination, but political expedience may be the major
consideration in allowing self-determination movements to secede in
443
non-colonial states.
The ambiguity in international law doctrine about the legality of a
community seceding from another masks the subjectivity of the
application of the principles. For example, the same Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States, noted above, also forbids secession or "any
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other
state. 44 4 Yet, the United Nations has recognized secessions in
numerous circumstances, as in Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Bangladesh,
and the others mentioned above. The distinction cannot be fully
explained by the difference between devolution with the former
sovereign's consent and secession produced by force. In several of these
countries, the former sovereign did not consent or consented only after
445
force made clear the futility of resistance, as in Slovenia.
Coherence and consistency in these positions may be elusive, but
their unproductiveness is clear. The ultimate objection to this debate is

Thus, the UN Security Council and other international bodies solemnly and
repeatedly declare that "independence achieved by force of arms is unacceptable,"
and that negotiations over the status of subnational communities must be
predicated on recognition of the territorial integrity of the affected state. At the
same time, the international community has made clear that it %,ill accept,
however reluctantly, the forcible breakup of a state, if that breakup is successfully
concluded.
David Wippman, Treaty-BasedInterventiolL Who Can Say No?, supra note 419. at 663-64.
441. Ratner, supranote 434, at 590 (citing leading authorities on self-determination
and secession). See also McCorquodale, supra note 437, at 857-58 (stating that present
approaches to the issue of self-determination have not provided a coherent framework).
442. BUCHHEIT, supra note 416, at 211.
443. Canuel, supranote 434, at 86.
444. G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28 at 121, r 7-8., U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1970).
445. In early 1992, the European Community recognized the new countries of
Croatia and Slovenia, as the Serbian hesitant military campaign was ineffective in
preventing their departure. The Futility of War, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1992, at 14. The
Serbian army decided that it could not win in Slovenia. and so withdrew. Quiet, But No
Peace, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1991, at 55. "Where Yugoslavia used to be, four new
countries--Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia & Hercegovina-have acquired or
will soon acquire their own flags and seats at the United Nations." A Truly Dangerous
Idea, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 12.
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that it has been waged for years and has led only to an intractable
stalemate. Considering the history of Cyprus, reliance on these classic

international law positions is no longer profitable for any party. More
importantly, it is not necessary. A middle ground is available amid
today's nuanced notions of intergovernmental and supranational
cooperation. 446
The irrepressible question persists:
Should not
intelligent leaders embrace a more flexible approach to achieve shared
goals, but with less devotion to old forms and rhetoric of a not-soconsistent international law? Recognizing that the controlling principles
of international law can be ambiguous, that geo-politics plays a role, and
that responsibility for the Cyprus division falls not simply to one side,
but rather to many, 447 a middle ground seems a realistic and fair course
to pursue. All parties should advance the reality that Cyprus is the
''common home" of the two ethnic communities and that both have the

right to participate in its decision making "on an equal footing. '448 Thus,
the two communities and the other international leaders should progress
to the substance of cooperation.
Another unpleasant but compelling reality of Cyprus' complex
situation today underscores the ineffectiveness of the present debate and
recommends the same middle ground. Two distinct communities have
been, for a quarter of a century, entrenched in separate functioning
polities, each securely guarded by ethnic alliances and massive military
enforcement. A pragmatic analysis of the current UN-EU strategy and
the formal resolutions undergirding their negotiating approaches
inevitably dead-ends into the unfortunate likelihood that this present

conflict shows little sign of resolution and that, in such disjunction, the
militarily-divided Cyprus will not be allowed to accede to the European

Union. 449

446.
Cooperation, sovereignty, and self-determination are "capable of embracing
much more nuanced interpretations and applications...." S. James Anaya, The Capacity
of InternationalLaw to Advance Ethnicor NationalityRights Claims, 75 IOWA L. REv. 837,
842 (1990) (referring primarily to self-determination).
447.
All of the principal players in Cyprus share accountability for the events
leading to the division of the island. "It has aptly been said that the Greek Cypriots
cannot remember what happened between 1963 and 1974 and that the Turkish Cypriots
cannot forget." DODD, supra note 215, at 33. Multiple, complex events and policies
produced the present division on Cyprus. "The current episode in Cyprus began in 1974
with the Turkish invasion of the northern third of the island, triggered by an attempted
putsch by Greek nationalists seeking unification with Greece, itself then governed by a
military regime." EMERSON, supra note 197, at 72. Moreover, the United States, Britain,
Turkey, and Greece have also been criticized for acts and omissions contributing to the
Cyprus dilemma. See infra note 484 and accompanying text.
448.
UN Secretary-General, Opening Statement (Feb. 26, 1990), reprinted in
NECATIGIL, supra note 106, at 437.
449.
Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl conceded privately that a divided
Cyprus would not be permitted accession. JOHN NEWHOUsE, EUROPE ADRIFT 258 (1997).
At best, the military separation on the island makes Cyprus "a difficult case" for accession
at this time. Peter Norman, Bonn Upbeat About EU Enlargement, FIN. TIMES, June 23,
1999, at 2. "EU governments... remain skeptical about admitting a divided country...
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In spite of Greek insistence and the acquiescent political promises
to the contrary, common sense argues against accession into the
Community of only the southern two-thirds of a militarily-divided island.
Greece exercised its EU veto at a strategic time and extracted the
European leaders' initial promise of Cypriot accession without resolution
of the island's division. Yet, attaining the ultimate, actual vote for
accession is another matter.
While the belabored dialogue has brought the sides closer in theory,
a final agreement on actual, concrete collaboration has remained elusive.
Any realistic movement toward breaking this impasse demands a new
theoretical framework. The general theory proposed here stems
pragmatically from that realization, reasoning to the most likely manner
of the conflict's resolution. Facing the lack of success from the longstanding UN negotiating efforts, the logical approach is to direct the
rising energy of EU leadership toward the opportunity, to seize the
momentum of today's enthusiasm for enlargement, and to renovate the
political dialogue, 450 proposing a collaborative model founded on the core
agreements achieved in past negotiations and on the broad, systemic
successes of the EU's functional evolution. All interested parties,
including especially NATO and the United Nations, should be included
in this marshaling effort, but EU leadership must occupy the dominant
negotiating role as the accession process continues to motivate political
and legal reform.
Enlargement has changed the political landscape of Europe and
today presents the most strategic context for settling the disputes and
fostering peace in this area. "Enlargement is a 'foreign and security
policy' in the sense that the prospect of admitting and the eventual
accession of... countries into the EU may help resolve age-old conflicts
such as those which once plagued Western Europe." 45 1 Enlargement has
driven radical change in thinking about government and transnational
cooperation across the continent. 5 2
Giinter Verheugen, EU
Commissioner for Enlargement, has pointedly observed that the
accession process could encourage the resolution of the political conflict

they are unlikely to let Greek Cypriots in on their own." A Prickly Friend. ECONOMIST,
June 10, 2000. In January 2001, EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, while
predicting"a new qualitative stage" for the advance of enlargement in general, expressed
"deep concern" over the lack of progress in Cyprus. Peter Norman, EU Talks on
Enlargement"Set to Pick up Momentum,"FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2001, at 2. One senior EU
official foresees a "nightmare... if the Greek-Cypriots get in on their own." The Cyprus
Conundrum, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2001, at 28.
450.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 137.
451.
Enlargement is, of course, a foreign policy tool. Krenzler, supra note 1, at 1.
452.
The campaigns to satisfy the accession criteria have fostered widespread legal
reform in all of the candidate countries. See generally Agenda 2000 and subsequent
annual Commission Regular Reports for each candidate country for the massive
transformation of law taking place in central and eastern Europe.
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in Cyprus. 453 Many others have observed the appeal of accession as a
454
motivator for solving issues.
The present impasse is partially the product of Cypriot leaders'
judgment that the division is preferable to the concessions necessary to
dissolve it, 455 so there has been less motivation to risk political capital.
The UN peacekeeping efforts have been part of the equation of
stalemate-the parties are not "hurting," as one expert describes it, and
they have less incentive to pursue a political settlement. 456 Now, on the
other hand, with accession offering palpable gains to both sides, the
parties are more likely to reconfigure the political arithmetic and pursue
a new direction. If a change in political will is what is required to solve
the Cyprus conflict, 4 57 accession offers the most likely impetus for that
change.
With the benefits of EU accession as motivation and based on the
experience of the European Community's successful evolution, the two
Cypriot communities, supported by their neighbors and the European
Union, should embrace a convention of accession collaboration-a form
of broad Accession Partnership among the two communities and the
European Union, erecting a structure and a process, familiar concepts in
European integration, for the cooperative advance of the island's two
communities acting in concert under one unique entity. The unique form
could purposefully marginalize older unproductive and inflammatory
issues. While such a focused, formal collaboration among the European
Union and two divided communities would be new, the practical details
of peaceful co-existence on Cyprus have been explored repeatedly. The
issues and the parties' positions are well-know. What this plan adds is
impetus, direction, and structure.
This novel accession partnership-adopting EU methods and
stabilized with EU leadership-would embark on a joint enterprise to
launch a forward-looking, open-ended structure and building process for
the future accession of the island. Pragmatism has been the watchword
of EU governance, 458 and the same should apply for Cyprus. As with
early, incremental peacebuilding in western Europe, a structure for
initiating limited collaboration between the two Cypriot communities

453.
Interview by Robert J. Guttman with Gunter Verheugen, European
commissioner for enlargement, Washington, D.C., in EUROPE, June 2000, at 19.
454.
Other experts agree with this compelling appeal of enlargement enthusiasm.
See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 136 (agreeing that the EU has a "unique position to
play a role in bringing about permanent peace and stability on the Mediterranean island
and in the region.").
455.
HART, supra note 193, at 136.
456.
HAMPSON, supra note 187, at 28.
457.
As observed in the Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good
Offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/1994/629, para 52, 30 May 1994.
458.
GRANT, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that tackling challenges together that
cannot be well-handled alone may be an apt description of why Cyprus' communities must
work together).
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with a common process to work together for common purposes offers a
realistic approach. Small steps could break the impasse and, over time,
lead to peaceful cohabitation, full trade, and accession to the European
Union.
The first step would be for the European Union to lead the two
communities and their patron countries, Greece and Turkey, and other
significant contributors 4 59 to a Cypriot intergovernmental conference at
which a new course could be considered honestly in an open forum. The
conflict on Cyprus has been both "intranational and international," and
therefore any settlement or cooperative arrangements must recognize
the linkages between all the different interests involved.4 60 The fruitless
bilateral exchanges of the past decades have fallen into a familiar
pattern, as each side recounts the historical and moral sins of the
other. 46 1 The leadership of the European Union and the other
participants could encourage candor, compromise, and assurances of
support for the accession project.
Foremost at the conference, a critical threshold obstacle to the
dialogue must be finessed: the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United
Nations and the European Union must abandon, or at least side-step,
the notion that the TRNC does not exist. Deadlock is guaranteed until
mutual acknowledgment of the two Cypriot communities is--even in
some flexible form-achieved. A central difficulty in reaching any accord
is that each side "sees the dispute over the status of the other as
4 62
fundamental."
What makes this debate so intractable is that it is part of the larger
debate over the nature of political community and the meaning of
statehood. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots view Cyprus as a bifurcated
state composed of two equal and independent political communities.

Greece and the Greek Cypriots view Cyprus as a unitary state consisting
of a single political community with a majority and a minority. The
international community has vacillated between these two views, which
represent fundamentally different legal and political approaches towards
resolution of the conflict.

463

The UN approach has proven counterproductive with the status
issue, taking one side as a legitimate government but not the other,

459.

Each country and international organization with a traditional role in this

dispute would be invited, though participation would be structured by the conference
organizers, the European Union, and the two Cypriot communities.
460. HAMPSON, supra note 187, at 36.
461.
"Bilateral negotiations of any parties to a serious conflict frequently rebult in
deadlock as each rehearses its version of history with its betrayals, atrocties, and the like,
and points to the ethical validity in legal and moral terms of its case when compared with
that of its adversary." A.J.R- Groom, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Tread Mill in

Diplomacy, in CYPRUS INTRANSITION 126, 154 (John TA. Kouloulides ed., 1986).
462.
Christopher Brewin, Turkey, Greeceand the European Union, in CYPRUS: THE
NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVES 148, 165 (Clement H. Dodd ed., 1999).
463.
Wippman, InternationalLaw and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus,supra nute 51, at
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while bringing them together to the table as if they were equals. 464 This
illogical quasi-dialogue must be disconnected and a new, meaningful
medium explored. The continued failure to advance the peace process
makes plain the need to modify the current UN-EU insistence that the
TRNC's very existence is illicit. Some see the central problem as the
"1964 [UN resolution recognizing] the Makarios Government as that of
the whole island" and guaranteeing undivided sovereignty for the
Republic as well as the island's territorial unity and independence. 4 6
The EU's stoic support of this unproductive position is no longer
necessary. The new forms of today's European Union and other regional
cooperative efforts illustrate that sovereignty and political power can be
divided and shared.
Here, on this central issue, is where creative forms can break the
impasse and advance the process of cooperation. Working together in a
limited and structured accession program does not necessitate creating a
traditional federal state, and the discussion should focus more on how to
share notions of sovereignty and the operation of limited governmental
functions. 466 Some experts suggest going "beyond traditional concepts"
46 7
to create a new form with both a division and a sharing of sovereignty.
Furthermore, the historical period in which most states enjoy full,
unlimited sovereignty is finished-the globalized economy and the large
468
number of transnational actors have now dispersed political power.
As the European Union has demonstrated, real sovereignty in today's
4 69
world is shared sovereignty.
This offers the most reasonable path for breakthrough on the
sensitive issues of unity and sovereignty. The European Union should
lead the two communities to an agreement based in general on the
proposal for the 1997 UN negotiations in New York, which envisions
sovereignty as "emanating equally" from both communities. 470 This
change to an open-ended, innovative concept could side-step the stale
positions on which both sides have invested so much capital. From this
fresh position of a recognized shared sovereignty, they may then proceed

464.
Brewin, supra note 462, at 164-65.
465.
Axt, supra note 256, at 180, 179-81.
466.
Tanja A. Borzel & Thomas Risse, Who is Afraid ofa Europeanfederation?How
to Constitutionalisea Multi-Level Governance System (Jean Monnet Working Paper No.
7/00), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/oo0OfOlOl.html (Hard copy on file)
(The authors criticize the "stylised dichotomy of the 'Confederacy of European States"' and
the "European federal State" which has dominated the political debate about the 'finalite
politique"of the European integration process.").
467.
Id. (Such sharing and division already exists in today's EU.).
468.
Michael Prowse, Party'sover for small states with attitude, FIN. TMES, Mar. 3,
2001 at XXVIII. ("[S]overeignty, in practice, is measured not by the pompous assertions of
politicians in assemblies but by the power that nations can actually project.").
469.
Id.
470.
See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.

20011

CYPRUS IN EUROPE

to share authority over limited common accession enterprises, working
together toward accession goals.
The UN's sole and unitary sovereignty approach has failed the
pragmatic test in Cyprus because it has propped up a fiction. Contrary
to years of proclamations and resolutions, two separate governments are
operating on the island. Nothing in the present approach suggests any
change in this fact. The most reasonable course for the future is to
recognize reality and work with it, rather than to fruitlessly demand its
resolution according to one view.
As on the issue of sovereignty, further constructive and face-saving
new relationships can promote effective implementation of accession
collaboration, as well as dialogue leading to future enhanced cooperation
on a wider level. This model recommends an accession partnership to
lead the island into the European Union: in a novel form of a limited yet
overarching common authority comprising two communities and two
zones, yet sharing political authority and sovereignty in planning and
implementing a program for advancing gradually toward evolving
cooperation and ultimately accession. This model would balance the
security and political interests of the separate sides, yet accommodate
the need for incremental progress, offering a "middle" way for Cyprus,
blending "both federal and confederal components, with a creative
tension between the two,"47 1 as in the European Union. The new
inclusive authority would represent the island in the EU processes, as
well as involve the European Union in the joint administration of the
enterprise. Under the rubric of a discrete EU-Cyprus project, the
authority could administer the gradual process of the island's accession,
as goals are set and pursued, yet recognize the two communities as
quasi-autonomous, quasi-sovereign states, similar in concept to the
quasi-sovereignty of states in the U.S., Swiss, or other federal contexts.
"As in Belgium, the integrity of [each] state would be conditional on the
practical right of self-rule in their own areas by the dominant cultural
communities." 472 The two Cypriot states would retain their present de
facto autonomy in all matters except the accession project processes and
competencies to which they specifically agree. The accession convention
could establish a foundation as articulated in the 1992 UN "Set of ideas,"

471.
Geoffrey Howe, A middle way for Europe, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at 15.
The weak federation model seems to be "the most probable and promising" long range
solution. Axt, supra note 256, at 187. Confederation has been suggested by many as a
solution for Cyprus, and the concept of some form of broadly defined yet carefully delimized
association between the two separate states, to initiate cooperation and confidence
building collaboration would be a reasonable start. See, e.g., Nanette Neuwahl. Cyprus,
Which Way?-In Pursuit of a Confederal Solution in Europe. (Harvard Jean Monnet
Working Paper 4/00), at 1.
472.
Brewin, supranote 462, at 170.
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acknowledging the political equality of the two communities and the
primary power of each over matters reserved to its competence. 473
This new limited quasi-confederation, perhaps with a forward
looking name such as The Accession Partnership of Cyprus, could erect
collaborative structure and process with the functionalism of the original
Coal and Steel Community as a guide. Collaborative intergovernmental
processes would be agreed upon to control the fundamental decisionmaking and planning of the accession program, with a discrete grant of
supranational authority in the limited sector of implementation of
agreed-upon accession projects. The project would establish leadership
for decision making and administration of the accession project. The
partnership would deliberate and decide on specific initiatives for the
accession program, such as the opening of borders, the promotion of
interchange and the reduction of burdens on commerce between the two
communities, timetables, and conditions insuring gradual, secure
progress toward harmonization. The disbursement of accession support
resources would also constitute a primary responsibility for the
partnership.
In addition, the program could adopt broader confidence-building
measures to foster further concrete collaboration, 4 74 including the
promotion of tourism, the environment, and perhaps the operation of a
common public utility. 4 75 As time progresses, this could evolve with

further agreements and expansions of cooperation, as progress toward
accession targets is achieved. Subsequent conventions could allow and
promote enhanced cooperation in numerous fields or adjust machinery
that proves imperfect in practice, as has occurred in successive EU
treaties.
Thus, this theory suggests a flexible, evolving structure, beginning
with the joint exercise of power and only a modest limitation of
reciprocal sovereignty, in a small clearly-defined and limited area of
supranational collaboration and a broader area of intergovernmental
cooperation, accompanied with the creation of the nascent instruments
and institutions necessary to administer the common accession endeavor

473.
Set of Ideas, annexed to United Nations, Security Council, Report of the
Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, U.N. Doc. S/24472 &5 (1992).
474.
The appeal of confidence-building measures has been suggested often for
Cyprus. See, e.g., Security Council resolution 789 (1992) of 24 November 1992, T 8.
475.
One example could be a collaboration of an improved, shared public water
utility. The island suffers water shortages, and Turkey has already initiated what it terms
a "peace water project," hoping that it might serve as a catalyst for some reconciliation on
the divided island. Metin Munir, Turkish Peacepipe to carry water to Cyprus, FIN. TmIEs,
Jan. 18, 2000, at 6. The plan calls for a sixty-eight mile long, floating water pipeline from
Turkey's southern coast, under the Mediterranean, to the TRNC. Turkey switches priority
to waterpipeline for northern Cyprus, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 4, 2000. Thus, a joint
water "high authority," to use old ECSC terminology, could be established with
transnational authority, to manage the shared supply, allocation of costs, and
maintenance.
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and promote democratic values and peace. 47 6 The concrete structure of
the instruments and institutions could also follow the early Coal and
Steel model, comprising an Administration under the intergovernmental
leadership of a Council of Ministers, with advice and consent of a
popular Assembly. Such a collaborative structure would be established
for the general administration of the project's limited purposes, as well
as for representing the island in EU processes. The assembly and the
common administration would provide both democratic expression and
administrative competence, while the Council would enable the two
separate states a large measure of security and control. The process and
its legal norms-somewhere between national laws and international
law--could "act as a fulcrum between the normative framework of the
social and political system on the one hand, and the life-world conditions
of the addressees of regulations on the other."477 In all matters relating
to the project, the two constituent Cypriot "states" would enjoy
proportionate representation, yet retain a veto. The most important
478
quality of government is creating a climate of consent.
The process of accession collaboration must include democratic
accountability and not just "mask the extension of bureaucratic
power."479 Much is written about the EU's democratic deficit, and few
would argue about the essential value of having "democratic
discourse. '48 0 Thus, democratic organs and processes must accompany
the collaboration's short-term execution, as well as its long-term
extension and evolution. In a construct of ethnic and cultural
heterogeneity, as in Cyprus, no common Volk or people will bring
legitimacy, so the notion of closer cooperation between the different
peoples bound together in cooperation will need a broader democratic
basis or foundation, 48 ' thus the fundamental importance of transparent,
popular discourse.
The two communities should not be expected, at this time, to agree
to "an ever closer union" 482 or a traditional full unitary state as their
ultimate goal, but they could agree to pursue accession and to begin, at
their own pace, to introduce the basic principles of the European Union
to their consociational partnership. This pursuit should not and need

476.
See, e.g., Neuwahl, supranote 471, at 1. Including some joint macunery of
deliberation and decision making and a jointly manned central administraton." Id. at 1
This beginning, narrow plan entails only "partial internalisation in the legal and pohucal
sphere-and virtually none at the social level." Zrn & Wolf, supra note 402, at 274.
477.
Id. at 274.
478.
Larry Siedentop, A Crisisof Legitimacy, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24. 2UUI, at 27.
479.
Id.
480.
J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Tdo:;, and the
GermanMaastrichtDecision,3 EurL L.J. 219, 222 (1995).
481.
Id. at 230.
482.
This language in the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union treata unity
as "a vanishing point in the future." Hans Lindahl, European Ilntegration: Popular

Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries, 6 EUR L.J. 239, 250 (2000).
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not be rushed; trade advantages and other benefits of the EU customs
union can gradually be extended across the island.4 83 The parties enjoy
wide flexibility in fashioning creative forms, as evidenced in today's
changing political landscape, as discussed above. 48 4 Following Western
Europe's early steps, the threshold course must transcend the solely
statal view in considering legal concepts and institutions, 48 5 aiming for a
form of limited intergovernmental and supranational legal cooperation,
with a purpose not just to stabilize relations, but to transform them
toward a common future. 48 6 The two communities dividing the single
island of Cyprus need progress in cooperation, not stabilization.
The unfortunate history of ethnic conflict on Cyprus compels a
careful strategy for bringing the island physically together. There is
little alternative to allowing ethnic separation to continue in some form,
as a part of a process that will lead to reintegration. 48 7 Retaining the
separate identities of the two communities at this time is both prudent
and unavoidable, and the European Union is situated opportunely to
provide the framework for bringing these two cultural communities
closer in an accession partnership, while respecting their identities. 488
Herein lies the implicit significance of the Cyprus challenge. How
does the leadership create peace and then cooperation between two
communities so long divided by such a history of tortured conflict? The
answer lies in a European vision, in which these separations can furnish
the inspiration for the project. To make peace and set collaborative
processes into motion, while maintaining identity, is exactly the promise
and the challenge of today's European Union.
Today's European Union enjoys no one common demos in the
constitutional sense, and European integration recognizes the broad
differences of the many peoples of Europe. 48 9 In fact, retaining the
plurality of the peoples is "a desideratum of integration."4 90 Such a

483.
The natural benefits of increased trade, reduced costs, and pooled resources
will advance further cooperative endeavors.
484.
See supratext accompanying notes 400-03.
485.
Armin Von Bogdandy, A Bird's Eye View on the Science of European Law:
Structures, Debates, and Development Prospects of Basic Research on the Law of the
European Union in a German Perspective, 6 EUR. L.J. 208, 213 (2000).
486.
Id. at 224. The integrative function is key and such supranational cooperation
can serve as "an instrument for political and social transformation of a completely new
dimension for democratic societies." Id.
487.
Roger Cohen, EyewitnessAccount, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000 (Book Review), at
29.
488.
Brewin, supra note 462, at 162. The EU should "provide a framework for
enabling cultural communities to maintain their identities in territories where they are
not a majority." Id. at 168. Charles Grant predicts that the TRNC will ultimately join a
confederal arrangement with the EU. GRANT, supra note 1, at 48.49.
489. J.H.H. Weiler, Federalismand Constitutionalism:Europe's Sonderweg (JEAN
MONNET WORKING PAPER No. 10/00), at 2 of 5, available at http://www.
jeanmonnetprogram.org/P...s/JeanMonnetpapers/00/001001 .html.
490.
Lindahl, supra note 482, at 239.
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concept is viable in Cyprus even though the communities are so divided
by ethnicity, culture, and history. History has seen generations pass and
wars fought in a country before one demos evolves to reflect a "sense of
mutual belonging transcending political differences and factions and
constituting a political community essential to a constitutional compact
of the classical mould."49 1 As in the European Union, this model
proposes to erect a compelling telos of accession, implicitly bringing
peace, inclusion, and incremental cooperation between two different
communities, in spite of the absence of one common demos. The
acceptance of the common telos can be a first step "towards a thicker
social and political notion of constitutional demos,"492 an important longterm goal for Cyprus. 4 93 The commonality of the people of the two
communities in Cyprus, they share "a deep-rooted heritage-however
much they may wish not to acknowledge it,"49 4 is sufficient to form the
common allegiance to core values, such as peace, civil society, and
economic progress.
Sometimes, separation or de-unification is not necessarily
nondemocratic, as with the devolution in the former Czechoslovakia, the
former Yugoslavia, or the former Soviet Union. 4 95 A united trust and
public opinion are needed to make representative government work. 49 6
And separate languages play a role. The recent history of Europe offers
no evidence that "the immensely diverse peoples of Europe, speaking
such different languages, having such disparate histories, geographies,
cultures, and economies, are ready to merge peacefully and voluntarily
into a single polity." 497 People sharing the same language, culture, and
traditions logically want to share their own government. 498 A primary
goal should be liberal order, not with some artificially maintained
geographical unity as a primary quality, but rather with focus on peace

491.

J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 489, at 5.

492.

Id.

493.
By retaining central powers in the two separate states, the model fosters
sensitivity to diverse range of cultural, economic, and social differences--a requisite to
constructive evolution to more progressive collaboration. See LARRY S|EDE.N-rOP,
DEMOcRAcY IN EUROPE 26-31 (2000). Enhancing diversity in the collaborative process
advances the project more than adversarial competition for single prevailing victors on the
numerous potentially divisive issues arising in the project. Id.
494.
Groom, supra note 39, at 126.
495.
TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, HIsToRY OFTHE PRESENT 322 (1999).
496.
Id. at 325 (citing John Stuart Mill, Ash emphasizes that democracy requires

trust).
Id. at 250. The devolution in Belgium is another example of ethnolinguistic
497.
groups demanding more self-government. Scotland too provides another example of this,
as well as the rise in regionalism and the decline of statism. Id. at 322. This has been
termed Britain's "daring experiment in devolution." UndoingBritain,EcoxO.IST, Nov. 6,
1999, at 3. For a detailed description of Swiss and Belgian linguistic political balancing
along linguistic lines, see James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation.State. Towards a
New Theory of the State Under InternationalLaw, 17 BERKLEY J. INt'L L 193, 230 &
nn.154, 156 (1999).
ASH, supra note 495, at 316-31.
498.
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and freedom. 4 99 Thus, the European Union could lead the parties
together, respecting the identities of the two communities.
"[Tihere is no need to demonise diversity, overlapping authorities
and multiple identities. Divergence is a normal state of affairs. Some
would even argue that divergence is 'pluralism' by another name, and
that it is Europe's greatest historical and cultural treasure." 500 Fixed,
mutually exclusive forms of territoriality are no longer the basis of
political life-the European Union, for example is very good at
"unbundling territoriality."50 1 One expert observed:
"Peversely,
Cyprus's division might have to be recognised before it can be
overcome .... Once their borders are made clear and their international
status is settled, the two sides in the Cyprus conflict, like France and
Germany before them, could get on with reconciliation, economic
50 2
integration, and a stable peace."
After the parties agree to the principle of accession cooperation,
they would be rewarded with a special EU accession process and
timetable, with economic and other cooperative incentives. In the lofty
context of transition to accession of the whole island, incentives and
deliberative structure can encourage advancement and accountability at
the same time.
Security is an overarching concern on all sides. In view of the past
violence, care must be taken to insure the physical safety of the people
and the stability of their economic and cultural interests. In the earliest
stage of cooperation, the EU principles of the four freedoms would
constitute long term goals to be pursued gradually with full discussion
by the parties. In particular, issues such as freedom of movement, of
settlement, and of property purchase, must be handled with care and
over time. The free movement of people to travel and work on both sides
of the island should be introduced as soon as basic security controls are
in place. Gradualism is the underlying principle of the evolving
cooperation and interaction of the communities.
A special Pan European police force with a mixture of EU, UN, and
NATO peacekeepers could keep and enforce the peace.
This
international force should be coordinated and directed by the European
Union, as a part of the project. 50 3 This peacekeeping mission would be
stationed throughout the island to insure safety and to assist in the
orderly development of the project, but the regular police forces of the

499.
Id.
500,
Jan Zielonka, Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration, Joan
Monnet Working Paper No. 7/00, availableat http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/
00100f0801-03.html.
501.
Id.
502.
Phillip Gordon, Cyprus: Divorce Could Precede Reconciliation,INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 24, 1997 at 8. Gordon is a senior fellow at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
503.
Brewin, supranote 462, at 171. Brewin argues that the EU could step up to its
duty of placing a security force in Cyprus. Id.
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two Cypriot communities would remain in each zone, coordinated and
under the direction of the special force. To insure continuity and build
confidence, both Turkish and Greek forces would participate in the
peacekeeping force, though in much smaller numbers than in their
present massive forms, all under the authority of the accession project
administration.
The rule and uniformity of law, in the limited spheres of common
competence, would be infused by a creative dispute resolution and
enforcement institution. The parties, with EU leadership, would craft a
system of judicial interpretation and adjudication that brings together
mediation structures and ultimately an arbiter to finally resolve
disputes arising in the processes and general administration of the
project. 50 4 Mediation by joint panels could begin the dispute resolution
process, perhaps followed by referral to a panel of arbiters appointed by
the Council of Ministers for resolution of difficult cases. On the other
hand, the regular courts and administrative decision makers of the two
communities would remain functional for matters in each community
zone unrelated to the accession project.
After a successful period of stabilization, the freedom to purchase
property should be authorized by the island's joint legislative processes,
again with EU guidance and supervision. Likewise, the restoration of
some property, with any necessary compensation and support for
inhabitants moved, would be decided by the partnership. Free
movement of capital would be introduced gradually and some
modification on the freedom to purchase property would be necessary
initially-the Turkish Cypriots fear that the richer Greek Cypriots
would simply buy up key properties, disenfranchising the Turkish
Cypriots in a new fashion. 50 5 Special consideration must be given to
protect short term and long term interests, all in a gradual plan to build
stability. After further passage of time, the accession project's joint
authority would introduce further freedoms, appropriate to the
circumstances.
Overall the multiple benefits of the collaboration would drive the
project: economic, political, even moral. Both sides would gain access to
the whole island and the beginning of its restoration from a war zone to
a prosperous trading center. Greek Cypriots would, ultimately, regain
territory and Turkish Cypriots would end isolationism and receive
economic growth. 50 6 They both would gain with ultimate accession to
the European Union. This cooperative plan offers the TRNC its ultimate
incentive to move in a new direction, the one thing it cannot have in the

504.
Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution?.supra note 480, at 223 Further. a
court must be available to adjudicate disputes arising from application of the pwre',S, to
enforce the agreements, and to provide the "intellectual and moral leader-hip" that
majoritarian organs sometime fail to offer. Id.
505.
Brewin, supra note 462, at 170.
506.
Wippman, supra note 51, at 177.
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current structured negotiations: acknowledgment as a legitimate,
though limited, government.50 7 Both sides would benefit enormously
from access to EU funds and markets, including development and
structural funds, as well as free transfer of goods. Both sides would
enjoy the freedoms to travel and breathe freely all across the island. 50 8
A further incentive would be an EU fund set up to compensate those
dispossessed by the 1974 intervention.
It would be difficult to
immediately relocate these people back to their former homes to live
surrounded by members of the other communities.5 0 9 Forces could not
now enter to forcibly evict and restore property-the best that can be
expected is fair compensation, or if land books are available and in some
cases restoration possible, so be it through legal channels and over
time. 510 Rights to compensation could be early business for the island's
administration and other decision-making institutions. 51 ' The financial
commitment necessary for this would be modest in comparison to many
EU expenditures and would be one of the shrewdest investment the
European Union has ever made.
The recommended more affirmative role for Europe in Cyprus would
5 12
development in European integration on multiple levels.
positive
be a
First, achieving real progress in decompressing an historic pressure
point in Europe has obvious benefits for future enlargement and general
harmonization.
Removing the most pointed conflict on Europe's
southeastern edge would dramatically pacify the political and military
landscape of this volatile region. The East-West intersection in Europe,
with its diverse ethnic, political, and religious dimensions, forms a
lengthy and sensitive dividing line that demands careful attention. "It is
now the conventional wisdom that the proliferation of ethnic-violence
constitutes the greatest threat to public order and human rights since
the lifting of the Iron Curtain." 513 The political symbolism of a
successful, EU-led cooperative effort bridging that dangerous division
would be powerful. The momentum generated by a forward-looking and
inclusive European strategy in Cyprus would counter the current rise of
conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia.

507.
508.
509.

Axt, supra note 256, at 192-93.
HITCHENS, supra note 46, at xiii.
Brewin, supra note 462, at 162.

510.
Id. at 171.
511.
Brewin, supra note 462, at 162.
512.
Axt, supra note 256, at 183. While the EU has avoided becoming involved in
internal conflicts in its Member States, such as in Northern Ireland, Spain, Corsica, and
the Greek-Turkish arguments over boundaries in the Aegean, this active leadership fits
properly in the expanding role of the EU in shepherding enlargement and promoting
harmony in the region. Id.
513.
Ratner, supra note 434, at 590. "[Ethnic] hatreds ... [have] unleashed
centrifugal forces that are pulling states apart from Africa to Europe to South and Central
Asia." Id.
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Finally, the European Union, in leading such a collaborative project
in Cyprus, would promote the integrity of the overall European order.
Constitutions do more than just establish relationships between
authority, states, and individuals; constitutions embody moral
commitments and fundamental values, thus reflecting the collective
identity of the people. 514 Some commentators argue that the European
Union has a moral duty to act to foster peace because, in spite of all its
pragmatism, the European Union is held together by an "intangible
glue" of common European values, and it "cannot tolerate atrocities on
5' 15
[its] own doorstep.
The continuing integration of Europe is a normative process, which
involves competition among individuals, institutions, interest groups,
and others seeking to secure hegemony of their values.5 16 This process
therefore must accommodate many forms of conflicts: social, cultural,
economic, and historical. Integration "is not a bland process of social
change .... [or] a value-free, uncontradictory, goal-oriented flow of
historical events through time. On the contrary, it is a process of
conflict, of cooperation and competition, as different individuals,
institutions, groups, networks, and other organisations try to impose
their definitions of what is right ....within certain specific historical
circumstances." 517 The European Union must not ignore this deeper
purpose of its leadership. Thus, from practical peacekeeping to
theoretical value-setting, the EU's active intervention to help heal
destructive divisions in Cyprus advances multiple benefits.
On the other hand, the failure to seize the present opportunity to
advance accession in the eastern Mediterranean could well result in a
popular backlash against Europe. A process that promises much,
demands difficult commitments, and then delivers little produces
resentment at a minimum. 51 8 Scholars argue persuasively that the
promises of enlargement extended after 1989 changed the political
landscape of Eastern Europe, injecting a danger that the newly emerging
eastern polities would lose popular support for the orthodoxy of the
West's democratic and free market principles if the Western

514. Weiler, Federalism ad Constitutionalism,supra note 489. Professor Weiler
observes that the integrity of the national constitutional orders rests not only on legal
obedience and political power but also on moral commitment and identity. Government
arrangements ought to promote the fundamental values of the polity. Id.
515.
GRANT, supranote 1, at 9. See also Brewin, supra note 462, at 171 (arguing
that establishing peace on Cyprus may be an "international duty"); Axt, supra note 256. at
193 (The EU should support "any chance of rapprochement of both communities on the
island.").
516.
Francis Snyder, Editorial,6 EUR. L.J. 307 (2000).
517. Id.
518. William Pfaff,Frawceand EuropeAreDoingSome T2ings Right. INYT'L HE&RD
TRill., June 20, 1998, at 6.
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governments did not fulfill their promises.5 19 Such a twist in direction
could destabilize weaker governments in this important region, fostering
unrest, producing the opposite of European goals and values. Thus,
affirmative European leadership in this region would work wisely to
fulfill past promises.

V. CONCLUSION

After centuries of conflict and exploitation, the people of Cyprus
today witness surprisingly favorable circumstances for the meaningful
advancement of peace and cooperation on their divided island. The
dramatic shift in foreign policies between Greece and Turkey and the
rising energy of the EU's eastern enlargement process combined at the
Nice and Helsinki Summits to open the enlargement doors to Turkey,
thus making Cyprus' own accession and regional collaboration more
realistic. The alignment of these and the other lesser contributing forces
present the most opportune moment for progress on Cyprus in recent
history.520
The European Union should respond affirmatively.
Sometimes reaction to unexpected change can be as important as "the
preconceived product of political engineering. '5 21 The whole fortuitous
series of events suggesting an environment for rapprochement
recommends that the European Union act "in a new role as chief
522
catalyst" for a solution of the Cyprus question.
Of all the interested countries, institutions, and organizations, the
European Union appears best positioned to lead and leverage
constructive movement among the vital parties. As the preeminent
symbol of cross-border cooperation that evolved into revolutionary
political collaboration, the Eureopan Union is well-situated to lead the
other players to initial, impasse-breaking cooperation.
And,
enlargement presents the most realistic and strategic context for settling
the disputes and fostering peace in this area. Moreover, the EU's present
Mediterranean policy and relationships with the accession applicants
offer a concrete infrastructure for leadership.
The European Union should seize the opportunity to lead the two
communities and their supporting neighbors out of their futile

519.
Karin Fierke & Antje Weiner, ConstructingInstitutional Interests: EU and
NATO, 6 J. EUR. POL'Y 721, 737 (1999). As context changes meaning, the West's promises
were transformed into threats of instability in the emerging Eastern countries and threats
to the identity of the EU and NATO. Id. at 736.
520.
"A lack of ripeness" has been a frequent reason offered for the failure of so
many mediations to resolve the Cypriot dispute, but when situations become ripe,
leadership is needed to prompt action. FEN OSLER HAMPSON, NURTURING PEACE: WHY
PEACE SETTLEMENTS SUCCEED OR FAIL 27-28 (1996).

521.
522.

Krenzler, supra note 1, at 1.
Leyla Boulton, Lure of joining EU focuses Cypriots's minds on reunification,

FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at 3.
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stalemate, into a fresh dialogue for collaboration toward accession. Such
a new dialogue should embrace creative new forms of intergovernmental
and supranational cooperation. A unique form of Accession Partnership
between the two Cypriot communities and the European Union could
lead the parties past old issues and into a collaborative structure and
process to advance accession of the whole island. In the context of two
communities working together under a single, limited accession
authority, old issues of sovereignty and self-determination could be
remolded into less divisive forms, sharing power and sovereignty.
Considering the ambiguous application of international law, with
geopolitics playing a significant role, and acknowledging that many
countries share responsibility for the Cyprus stalemate, a middle ground
presents the most realistic and fair path to peace.
EU initiative in this region at this time could be of compelling
significance. To promote stability in this volatile region, as the newly
evolving countries of the former Soviet Union experiment with
democracy and rule of law and the Middle East simmers with unrest,
would advance EU goals on many levels: political, economic, and moral.
The political symbolism of an energized Europe, reaching out to share its
resources and promote its values, would communicate a firm leadership,
reassuring all witnesses of its strength. One group of scholars has
written: "The historic mission of European Union is to contribute to
stability and peace through integration ....observing that there was
no alternative to eastern enlargement after the events of 1989.523 The
same may be said today about the accession of Cyprus. The alternative
to EU leadership in advancing the European promise of peace and
cooperation in Cyprus is, at best, to forsake an opportunity for peace, or
at worst, to risk the frightening possibility that the Cypriot accession
process may run head-on into an unyielding political and military standoff, exploding into the antithesis of today's European ethos of
community.

523.

Krenzler, supra note 1, at 1.

